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ABSTRACT
This paper presents an automated model for generating courses of action in support
of an Operations Other Than War (OOTW) simulation The model simulates the decision
making of a theater level staff in the OOTW humanitarian assistance mission environment
The model uses probabilistic forecasting models and Bayesian techniques to predict what
the state of a region in the theater will be some time in the future Decision tree structures
and the forecasting module are used to solve the decision making problem using maximum
expected utility The model uses pairwise comparisons of utility attributes to obtain a
decision maker's preference structure This structure is applied over a multi-attribute
utility function and the decision tree, to find the optimal course of action for some region
of the theater at a specific time Some variations on Lanchester's attrition equations are
used to model attrition, the effect of civilians in a combat zone, and the effect of rules of
engagement The model was tested using data representative of Somalia in late 1992
The results indicated the best approach in this instance is to initially provide a high level of
aid to reduce the civilian starvation rates then transition to a more aggressive posture with










a Primacy of the Political and Diplomatic Instrument 7










a Intelligence Gathering 12
b. Psychological Operations 13
c. Civil Affairs 13
d. Public Affairs 14
e Security Requirements 14
f Operational Constraints 14
6. Roles 15
B SOMALIA SCENARIO 16
C FUTURE THEATER LEVEL MODEL 18
III NATURE OF THE PROBLEM 21
A MISSION PRIORITIZATION 23
B RESOURCE ALLOCATION 23
C KNOWLEDGE FUSION 24
D UNIT DECISIONS 25
E CONCLUSION 25
IV REVIEW OF LITERATURE 27
A DECISION THEORY 28
VII
B GAME THEORY 31
C PROBABILISTIC MODELING 33
D KNOWLEDGE BASED SYSTEMS 34
V MODEL 37




1 Threat Forecast 40
2 Civilian Aid Requirements Forecast 44
C. DECISION STRUCTURE 46
D UTILITY DEVELOPMENT 49
E ATTRITION MODEL 54
1 Attrition Coefficient Determination 55
2 Civilian Attrition Due to Lack of Aid 58
3 Combat Attrition 58
F DECISION SOLUTION 60
1 All Paths Algorithm 61
2. Resource and Utility Level Determination 62
3 Rollback Algorithm 62
G THEATER COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT 63





a Forecast Sample Size 70
b. Strength Estimate Variance 71
3 Utility Function Parameters 71
a Attribute Weights 72
b. p Values 74
C APPLICATION TO SOMALIA DATA 75
vm
D CONCLUSIONS 75
E FUTURE WORK 77
1 Forecasts 77
2. Utility Model . 78
3 Decision Model 78
4 Attrition Model 79
5
. COA Generation . 79
APPENDIX A NODE-ARC REPRESENTATION 81
A INTRODUCTION 81
B NODE DESCRIPTIONS AND ATTRIBUTES 81
C ARC ATTRIBUTES 82
APPENDIX B DISPOSITION OF FORCES 85
APPENDIX C UTILITY FUNCTION CURVES 89
APPENDIX D SAMPLE MODEL OUTPUT 93
REFERENCES 95
BIBLIOGRAPHY 97




5 1 Initialized Threat Forecast, N=4 40
5 2 Updated Threat Forecast. N=7 41
5 3 Updated Threat Forecast, N=23 43
5.4. Sample Civilian Aid Required Forecast, N=26 44
5.5. Nine Point Scale For Rankings 51
5 6. Utility Function Forms 54
6 1 Decision Maker's Attribute Weights 66
6.2 Initial World State 66
6 3 Attribute Weights Breakpoints For Coa Selection 73
6 4 Multiple Weight Impacts On Course Of Action Decision 74
A 1 Node Attributes 82
A.2. Arc Attributes 84
B 1 Aideed Supporters (Green Force) Disposition 86
B.2. Aideed Clan (Red Force) Disposition 87




2 1 Southern Somalia 18
3.1. Decision Making Structure 22
5.1 Influence Diagram 46
5.2. Threat Only Influence Diagram And Decision Tree 48
5.3 Civilians Only Influence Diagram And Decision Tree 49
6 1 Humanitarian Commander Combatant Casualties 67
6.2 Humanitarian Commander Civilian Casualties 67
6 3 Aggressive Commander Combatant Casualties 68
6.4 Aggressive Commander Civilian Casualties 68
6.5 Sample Output Showing Preference Overpowering Forecast 70
6 6 Effect Of Variance Change On Friendly Casualties 72
6 7 Casualty Trends For Somalia (Humanitarian Commander) 76
6 8 Casualty Trends For Somalia (Aggressive Commander) 76
6 9 Aid Delivery Rates 77
A 1 Node-Arc Network Of Somalia 81
C. 1 Friendly Casualties 89
C.2 Enemy Casualties 89
C 3 Aid Delivered 90
C.4. Civilian Casualties Due To Combat 90




The author would like to acknowledge the financial support for of the Louisiana
Maneuvers Task Force which paid for the travel and temporary duty expenses during the
research and sponsor interface portion of this project BG Morris Boyd, TRADOC,
DCSDOC, for sponsoring the research The support of COL Gary Griffin, LTC James
Harrison, MAJ Mike Woodgerd, and a host of others in the DCSDOC office who
provided guidance, inspiration, research materials, and motivation to keep this project on
schedule
The assistance of Professors Kneal Marshall and Hemant Bhargava of the Naval
Postgraduate School who provided guidance and insight in the design and development of
the decision making model Professor Craig Kirkwood of Arizona State University who
responded promptly to calls for help and without whom the model would not have been
completed on time LCDR Don Brutzman for being a sounding board and providing hope
when there seemed to be none
Last but certainly not least, my kind and loving wife, Mary Anne, who ran
interference, remained calm when chaos broke out, had the patience of a saint, kept the




Since the end of the Cold War the United States Armed Forces have been repeatedly
called upon to perform operations that are not related to winning a full scale war The
frequency of U.S. involvement in these type operations. Operations Other Than War
(OOTW), has increased at a rapid pace as the nation becomes more involved with United
Nations operations world-wide As a result, the development of appropriate decision
logic to use in models for these types of operations is of interest to the U.S. Army
In this environment, a decision maker must consider the impact of the planned
operation on civilians, the public opinion in the U.S., and the host nation In many
instances the political and diplomatic factors outweigh the tactical and military
considerations The problem is to develop a model which will simulate the decision
making process of a theater level staff in the OOTW environment The model must
consider as many of the OOTW specific factors as possible, while remaining
computationally feasible The model should be robust enough to handle a wide variety of
situations and yet be simple enough to easily see the cause and effect relationships evident
in the outcomes
In order to capture some of the salient features of the OOTW environment, the
decision making model uses existing decision theory and combat modeling algorithms and
adapts them to suit the problem at hand The forecasting module makes use of
probabilistic forecasts to produce decision probabilities for use in a decision tree The two
forecasts are a threat forecast and a civilian aid requirements forecast These forecasts use
a Bayesian approach with a simple updating scheme to achieve a change in the posterior
distribution of the decision probabilities Another forecast is used to model intelligence
gathered by sensors These forecasts estimate the number of enemy forces, civilians, and
the amount of foodstuffs a particular region of the theater contains This induces some
uncertainty in the decision module which allows the model to take into account the quality
of intelligence data available to the decision maker
xv 11
The decision module uses a decision tree structure and multi-attribute utility theory
to solve for the best course of action for a particular region of the theater at a specific
time The utility function form used is a logarithmic form with weights on each of the
component functions. The component functions measure the utility gained based on the
attributes of friendly casualties, enemy casualties, civilian casualties due to combat actions,
civilian casualties due to lack of aid, and amount of aid delivered. A pairwise comparison
of the attributes is performed by the decision maker which results in a least squares fit for
the weights of the attributes The weights are then used in concert with the component
utility functions to form the additive compound utility function. The decision tree is then
solved using a maximum expected utility criteria.
Lanchester's equations for the Square Law are used with attrition coefficients
estimated using the Bonder-Farrell approach for combat actions involving civilians
Deitchman's Mixed Law is used to model any attacks by enemy forces against US aid
convoys when no civilians are present To capture the effect of rules of engagement
(restrictions in use of force to reduce civilian casualties) the attrition coefficients used
when civilians are present are determined by the weight the decision maker places on
civilian casualties due to combat As the decision maker's weight for civilian casualties
due to combat increases, the attrition coefficient for US Forces decreases and the
attrition coefficient for enemy forces increases This models the effect of operating under
increasingly stringent rules of engagement
The decision model produces a course of action for each region in the theater for
each decision cycle However, there are typically not enough resources available to
execute every course of action simultaneously As a result, the final step in the decision
model is to rank order the regional courses of action by utility value obtained The
courses of action are executed from the highest valued course of action toward the lowest
until there are not enough resources available to execute the next course of action Any
unexecuted courses of action are deleted after the decision cycle is complete The
execution phase of the model takes the resources identified and applies them to the region
xvi 11
specified and the resultant change in the world state is observed This process continues
until the theater goal is accomplished or the resources are exhausted The model was




Since the end of the Cold War the United States Armed Forces have been
repeatedly called upon to perform operations that are not related to winning a full scale
war The scope of these operations has ranged from humanitarian assistance, host nation
assistance, hurricane relief, to protecting Kurds from attack following the Gulf War The
frequency of our involvement in these type operations has increased at a rapid pace as our
nation becomes more involved with United Nations operations world-wide From our
current national security strategy, a continental based force projection structure, and our
commitment to the humanitarian and peace missions throughout the world, we can expect
a sizable amount of resources from the Department of Defense to be spent in these
contingency type missions As a result, the development of appropriate decision logic to
use in models for these operations is of interest to the US Army
The objective of this thesis is to explore the field of decision making in an attempt
to collect a useful set of tools from which to fashion a workable model This model will
be used to generate a series of sub-goals or courses of action in an attempt to attain a
larger, theater level, goal The environment that this model will operate in is the
Operations Other Than War (OOTW) contingency operations environment Specifically,
an attempt will be made to apply the resultant model to the approximate situation in
Somalia in early 1993 The model must formulate realistic goals within resource
constraints and be capable of reacting to a changing world state Every effort must be
made to focus the effort of model development toward those aspects ofOOTW that make
these operations different than those of high intensity combat
In Chapter II the background information required to understand the problem is
discussed The tools required to analyze combat missions are plentiful and well studied
However, the nature of operations other than war missions has forced the Armed Forces,
in general, and the United States Army, in particular, to reexamine the way it analyzes
these missions The events in Somalia during Operation RESTORE HOPE have pointed
out the need to review our analytic techniques and develop new models to examine the
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particular issues associated with operations other than war. The Future Theater Level
Model has great potential for modeling these type operations.
In Chapter III the nature of the decision making problem in operations other than
war is discussed Decision making logic is the heart of any descriptive model of human
behavior It is through the process of making decisions that the effects of human thought
and action can be seen, measured, and analyzed. The analysis of operations other than
war missions has been overshadowed in the past by the requirement to study high intensity
combat operations against the former Soviet Union. However, since the demise of the
Soviet Union and the emergence of the United States as the last remaining superpower,
the frequency and number of operations other than war missions has multiplied
dramatically The need to develop models to examine this previously little studied area
has grown to become a concern for many key leaders in the U.S. Army. One of the most
important elements of these models will be the embedded decision making logic that
accurately represents the unique requirements of the operations other than war
environment
In Chapter IV pertinent research work done in preparation for solving the problem
is reviewed In all of man's written record there has been a preoccupation with conflict of
interest This preoccupation has become one of the dominant concerns for several
academic areas economics, sociology, political science, operations analysis, and others.
This has led to the development of numerous approaches to modeling conflicts of interest
among individuals and among institutions We will restrict our study to those areas that
are mathematically rigorous and computationally feasible This restriction narrows the





In Chapter V the construction and development of the model is discussed. In this
chapter the tools and methods discussed in Chapter IV are reduced to those required to
solve the problem The focus of this portion of the thesis is to rigorously develop a
mathematic representation of the model and generate source code to test the formulation
In Chapter VI the results and conclusions are discussed The sensitivity of the
model to various input parameters is evaluated In addition, the appropriateness of the
results are discussed and analyzed. The final portion of this chapter is dedicated to a
discussion of future work that could be done to improve the model.
This thesis attempts to formalize a model to use in a systemic simulation of military
operations in an operations other than war environment To the greatest extent possible
the salient features of the operations other than war environment are captured and used in
the formulation of the model

II. BACKGROUND
Since the end of the Cold War the United States Armed Forces have been
repeatedly called upon to perform operations that are not related to winning a full scale
war The scope of these operations has ranged from humanitarian assistance, host nation
assistance, and hurricane relief to protecting Kurds from attack following the Gulf War
The frequency of our involvement in these types of operations. Operations Other Than
War (OOTW), has increased at a rapid pace as our nation becomes more involved with
United Nations operations world-wide From our current national security strategy, a
continental based, force projection structure, and our commitment to the humanitarian and
peace missions throughout the world, we can expect a sizable amount of resources from
the Department of Defense to be spent for these contingency type missions
A. OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR
The tools required to analyze combat missions are plentiful and well studied
However, the nature ofOOTW missions has forced the Armed Forces, in general, and the
United States Army, in particular, to reexamine the way it analyzes these missions The
events in Somalia during Operation Restore Hope have pointed out the need to review our
analytic techniques and develop new models to examine the particular issues associated
with OOTW
1. Environment
One of the major differences between standard combat operations and OOTW
is the requirement to consider many diverse factors in the decision making process
Immediate solutions to difficult problems may not be obvious or may jeopardize
long-term objectives For example, certain military responses to civil
disturbance may solve the immediate crisis but subvert the legitimacy of local
authorities and cause further civil unrest Humanitarian relief and nation
assistance must not promote dependency on aid from outside sources Quick,
efficient action by U.S. Forces that resolve the immediate issue without
considering the long-term consequences and goals may promote instability In
operations other than war, victory comes more subtly than in war [Ref I
J
Operations in this environment can present a special leadership challenge since the
activities of relatively small units can have operational and even strategic consequences.
Commanders must be able to integrate activities of joint and combined forces as well as
civilian and host nation agencies. The successful use of intelligence from a variety of
sources, and an adept understanding of the regional and cultural orientations, can have an
impact on the ability of our forces to achieve their goals. The integration of resources and
efforts of a diverse group of forces and agencies to achieve our specific objectives are the
keys to success
OOTW will not always be peaceful operations There may be certain factions
that resort to fighting or other aggressive acts, in an attempt to defeat our purpose and
advance their own Our military forces have the intrinsic right to self defense, but the
overwhelming use of combat power may complicate the process toward accomplishing
our stated objectives As a result, commanders must expect to conduct operations under
restrictive rules of engagement
The Army's presence and their ability to operate in austere environments may
force them to become the de facto lead in operations normally conducted by other
agencies In this type environment, the commanders and staffs must be flexible and able to
adapt to many ad hoc arrangements for success. Thus, the decision making process must
take into account other factors not normally considered or only given a cursory
examination in combat operations
2. Imperatives
The imperatives of OOTW are derived from the principles of war that have
guided the war fighting doctrine of the Army for many years A summary of these
principles is necessary as they guide the decision making logic used by commanders and
their staffs to confront problems in the OOTW environment. These imperatives [Ref 2]
are the foundation for the proper frame of mind for decision making in OOTW
a. Primacy of the Political and Diplomatic Instrument
In military OOTW, political and diplomatic objectives affect military
decisions at every level from the strategic to the tactical. Commanders and their staffs
must understand the specific political and/or diplomatic objectives and the resulting impact
these objectives have on military operations. In most instances military operations will be
in support of some political or diplomatic objective within the theater
b. Unity of Effort
Unity of effort implies interagency integration and, when applicable,
coordination with the host nation to achieve a common goal. The primary elements for
unity of effort are common objectives, coordinated planning, and trust. Depending on the
theater command structure and goals, the military staff may be the lead agency for
planning and coordinating operations while in other instances the military staff may not be
the lead agency Military leaders must understand the impact their operational plans have
on political, diplomatic, economic, and informational initiatives.
c. Adaptability
Adaptability is the willingness and skill to change or modify existing
structures and methods, or to develop new structures and methods, to accomplish the
mission As the situation changes, military leaders must adapt through revising command
and control structures and missions to the new situation This requires careful mission
analysis, intelligence preparation, and in many instances, regional expertise.
d Legitimacy
Legitimacy is the willing acceptance by a people of the right of their
government to govern, the willingness of a people to support a cause or policy, or the
acceptance of a group or agency's right to make and enforce decisions Legitimacy
derives from the perception that authority is genuine, effective, and uses proper agencies
for reasonable purposes Appropriate use of the informational instrument of national
power in concert with military operations can significantly enhance both domestic and
international perceptions of the legitimacy of a given operation. No group or force can
decree legitimacy for itself, but it can create and sustain legitimacy by its actions. Military
leaders must be aware that their actions increase or diminish the perception of legitimacy
which can aid or hinder the accomplishment of the mission.
e. Perseverance
Perseverance is the patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national
goals and objectives for as long as necessary to achieve them. OOTW may not have a
clear beginning or end, and may not be marked by decisive actions culminating in victory;
however, this does not imply that decisive action cannot be taken Military operations in
this environment may involve protracted struggles. It is very important that the military
commander gain and maintain the initiative to persevere in the accomplishment of the
objective Perseverance helps ensure that both civilian and military leaders reject limited
short-term successes in favor of actions that support long-term goals.
/ Restricted Use ofForce
Restricted use of force refers to the judicious, prudent, and thoughtful
selection and employment of forces most suitable for the mission. Restricted use of force
does not preclude the possibility of employing massive or overwhelming force, when
appropriate, to display resolve and commitment The rules of engagement (ROE) for
military OOTW will usually be more restrictive, more detailed, and subject to more
political scrutiny than those associated with any other type operations. As a result, these
operations are often characterized by constraints on the weaponry, tactics, and level of
violence Rules of engagement formulated without regard to the impact of collateral
casualties and damage on the ultimate objective may be counterproductive, may prolong
the struggle, and may ultimately result in greater U.S. and hostile casualties than is
necessary Military commanders must be well versed in peacetime ROE, supplemental
measures, request channels, and procedures for implementing them.
3. Relationships
Overall U.S. policies and strategies for OOTW are developed and coordinated
by the National Security Council (NSC) through various interagency groups. These
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policies and strategies are promulgated through normal NSC structure to the various
departments and agencies Within the Department of Defense, the Secretary of Defense
exercises overall supervision and oversight of military OOTW policy and resources.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as the principal military advisor to
the President, Secretary of Defense, and National Security Council, provides advice on
matters relating to OOTW In addition, the Chairman is the channel through which
directives from the National Command Authority are passed to the combatant
commanders The Chairman also develops and establishes joint doctrine and formulates
policies for joint training and education concerning the military OOTW environment
The combatant commanders are responsible, in coordination with the respective
U.S. ambassadors, for the development and execution of military OOTW in their strategy
and plans They are the DOD focal points for operations and planning for military
OOTW It is imperative these commanders establish working relationships with the
appropriate ambassadors, since planning for military OOTW usually involves the
Department of State.
The political and dynamic nature of international relations poses organization
and coordination challenges for the combatant commanders and their staffs that demand
considerable flexibility and intellectual agility The military instrument of national power
will seldom, if ever, be in the lead, and direct application of US combat capabilities is the
least likely or preferred option Instead, indirect application of US military capabilities,
through the Department of State's security assistance program will be the norm The
interagency environment that typifies the other than war operational setting requires the
combatant commander and staff to integrate fully their efforts with those of other U.S.
Government agencies.
The U.S. diplomatic mission to the host nation includes representatives of all
US departments and agencies present in the host country. Interagency efforts are
coordinated among Country Team members and are subject to policy supervision and
control by the Chief of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission, normally an Ambassador, who is
responsible to the President for the conduct ofUS in-country policy and personnel. This
coordination process uses the Country Team concept to ensure all in-country activities
best serve US. interests The Country Team facilitates coordination among the
departments and agencies represented in the U.S. diplomatic mission.
The Country Team's organization depends on the desires of the Chief of the
Diplomatic Mission, the in-country situation, the agencies represented, and the character
and scope of U.S. interests in the host nation or region. The configuration of the Country
Team may vary from a large assembly with representatives from all the agencies in an
embassy, to a specialized team made up of those directly concerned with the problem at
hand, to a steering committee of a few members such as the Deputy Chief of the
Diplomatic Mission, Defense Attache, Agency for International Development
representative, and the Chief, Security Assistance Organization (CSAO). Given the highly
political nature of most other than war environments, Country Team coordination is
generally extensive, often assuming the form of policy control. This coordination is
intended to ensure unity of effort and eliminate counterproductive political and diplomatic,
economic, informational, or military initiatives
Although the combatant commander and the US area military commander are
not members of the diplomatic mission, they are usually represented on the Country Team.
This representation may be accomplished by the appointment of the CSAO as the
commander's in-country contact officer and/or by representation by a member of the
commander's staff The in-country security assistance organization may be designated as a
Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Joint Military Group, U.S. Military Training Mission,
Defense Field Office, or other title agreed upon by the host nation and diplomatic mission
In nations without such organizations, the Defense Attache or a foreign service officer
may perform the duties of contact officer.
The combatant commander's representative coordinates Country Team
guidance and proposed military activities with appropriate agencies and military
commands Because the coordination process is based on the unique composition of each
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Country Team, it follows no set pattern or style. The personality of the Chief of the
Diplomatic Mission and the relationship with the combatant commander will obviously
influence the dynamics of the coordination process This coordination is accomplished
with the combatant commander's staff which integrates both the theater planning and the
Joint Staff strategic planning process Required security assistance efforts are coordinated
with the combat commander's staff and the Defense Security Assistance Agency The
contact officer also coordinates, as needed, with the Department of State and appropriate
host nation agencies through the country team and the diplomatic mission Assisting the
combatant commander in the political coordination and communication process is the
political advisor, a member of the Department of State permanently assigned to the
combatant commander's staff
4. Missions
There are a variety of OOTW missions that the armed forces may be called
upon to perform [Ref 2] They include
Support to Insurgency and Counterinsurgency
Combating Terrorism
Peacekeeping Operations
Support to Counterdrug Operations
Contingency Operations
These missions have a wide array of military involvement and effort required For the
purposes of this study we will limit our exploration to Contingency Operations.
Contingency OOTW are undertaken in crisis avoidance or crisis management
situations requiring the use of military forces to enforce diplomatic initiatives, respond to
emergencies, or protect US lives These operations may take place throughout the
operational continuum, however, they are most prevalent in the other than war
environment The situation is dynamic in a crisis, and the amount of available information
grows virtually every hour based on intelligence reports An adequate and feasible
response in a crisis demands flexible procedures and requires rapid and effective
communications and coordinated plans
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Contingency operations are likely to have a strong psychological impact on the
attitudes and behaviors of the domestic and foreign populace. The capability of the world
media to rapidly disseminate information increases the impact of the reaction at home and
abroad This impact must be considered when planning and conducting these operations.
5. Factors
A number of factors influence the nature and scope of contingency operations.
These include the duration of the operation, the mobility and flexibility of available forces,
available intelligence, overflight rights, country basing rights, available fueling assets,
logistics support, communications support, psychological operations, civil affairs, public
affairs, security requirements, and operational constraints. In many instances these
operations are conducted in parts of the world with limited host nation resources, airfields,
or port facilities The factors most critical for our study are intelligence gathering,
psychological operations, civil affairs, public affairs, security requirements, and operational
constraints
a. Intelligence Gathering
Intelligence gathering is a particularly critical part of contingency
operations in an other than war environment The rapid introduction of US combat
forces requires precise planning and information concerning the threat and mission area
Accurate, detailed, tailored, and timely all-source intelligence can greatly influence the
success or failure of these operations
Gathering intelligence in the OOTW environment is somewhat different
from collecting combat intelligence In OOTW, we are still concerned with the threat and
the capability of the threat, however, we are also concerned with information concerning
the political situation and civilian unrest. Intelligence analysts must gather a wider array
of information from non-traditional sources to be effective in their mission. The Center
for Low-Intensity Conflict developed a system to aid the intelligence analyst in evaluating
this non-standard intelligence This tool is the Low Intensity Conflict Instability Indicator
Threat Matrix [Ref 2 and 3]. The matrix contains over 500 indicators that instability
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exists and a method to help quantify the nature of the threat from that instability. The
indicators cover a wide variety of intelligence data and are broken into subsets based on
the type of mission for which the analyst is gathering intelligence This matrix will help
form the inputs to the intelligence fusion process in the completed model
b. Psychological Operations
Psychological operations are important in OOTW contingency
operations because they can help exploit hostile forces' vulnerabilities and can target
audiences whose support is critical to success. Psychological operations are used to
disseminate information to civilians and threat forces to turn their opinion toward
supporting the U.S. initiate in theater. The information can take the form of print media,
radio broadcasts, and television broadcasts In essence, the effect of psychological
operations is to help create the perception that the U.S. Forces and operations represent
the best alternative to support, and that the threat is not worthy of support In the model,
we will use the psychological operations effects to alter other players' perceptions of US
Forces intentions
c. Civil Affairs
Civil affairs elements foster a strong working relationship between the
US Forces in theater and the host nation government officials and U.S. Forces and U.S.
Government agencies They have a high level of regional and cultural skills, as well as
professional and governmental expertise The civil affairs elements' major role is to help
foster a good relationship between the US Forces and the political agencies in theater
The effect of this role is to create channels of communication, coordination, and support
between the U.S. Forces and political agencies This communication helps the combatant
commander understand what is required from the political arm of national power and helps
the host nation and U.S. Government agencies feel comfortable about the activities of the
U.S. Forces In the model, we will use the civil affairs effect to establish effective




Public affairs programs can provide accurate and timely information,
consistent with operational security, regarding military operations to a worldwide
audience World opinion, to include the domestic U.S. audience, is often most influenced
by initial media reports The public affairs program is the interface between the media and
the US Forces Good public affairs programs can enhance the deterrent effect of U.S.
Forces by emphasizing our strength and resolve to use force as necessary. In addition,
these programs can help build the perception among the world populace that the
operations are proper and worth supporting In the model, we will use the public affairs
effect to improve or decrease the general populace support of U.S. operations in theater.
The level of support is directly tied to the operational restrictions placed on the U.S.
Forces commander.
e. Security Requirements
Operational security and deception are very important to the success of
any operation The impact of security requirements in OOTW is most often seen by the
amount of force required to protect U.S. facilities and forces. In any contingency
operation, we want to use the least amount of force to protect our assets, while
maintaining a suitable level of security The need to use the minimum amount of force
comes from the perception that is created in the eyes of the host nation government and
civilians In the model, we will use the instability indications from the intelligence analyst
and the level of support for U.S. operations by the general populace to determine the level
of security required.
/ Operational Constraints
Operational constraints are frequently imposed on military forces in
OOTW The National Command Authorities (NCA) determine the criteria for U.S.
Forces in peacetime. The mission, threat, as well as international law shape each
operation Host nation and other affected countries may impose constraints on force
levels and deployments. These constraints most often take the form of restrictions on the
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force levels or types deployed, limits on the use of deadly force (Rules of Engagement),
and restrictions on host nation facilities and air space use In the model, we will use these
constraints to limit the options available to the decision making logic at all levels. These
constraints will most often be fixed at the start of the simulation but may be dynamic as
the need arises
6. Roles






Freedom of Navigation and Protection of Shipping
Operations to Restore Order
Security Assistance Surges
Disaster relief operations are executed under the umbrella of humanitarian
assistance and provide emergency relief to victims of natural and man-made disasters.
Like humanitarian assistance, disaster relief operations are conducted across the full
operational continuum The U.S. military's participation in disaster relief has positive
impacts for the U.S. government as well as the host nation and its populace. The military
can provide the logistics support to move supplies to remote areas, extract or evacuate
victims, provide emergency communications, conduct direct medical support operations,
provide emergency repairs to vital facilities, and provide for civil relief and the
maintenance of law and order pending re-establishment of control by indigenous police
forces
The development of appropriate decision modeling for contingency operations
in an OOTW environment would dramatically aid in the understanding and analysis of
these missions For the development of this decision making logic, we will focus on one
particular type of OOTW mission: disaster relief The specific scenario we will use to
develop and test this logic is Operation RESTORE HOPE, famine relief in Somalia
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B. SOMALIA SCENARIO
Somalia's recent history is characterized by political unrest that culminated in civil
war and the ousting of the government, followed by clan warfare and a total breakdown in
government functions. The background and other information pertaining to Somalia were
largely taken from the U.S. Army report on Operation RESTORE HOPE, [Ref. 4].
Since the toppling of the government in January 1991, fifteen clans and sub-clans
have vied for power, pitted against one another along tribal lines in a multifactional civil
war None of the clans has been successful in wresting control and the nation has drifted
without a governing body for approximately two years. During this time the country's
infrastructure has deteriorated, rendered useless by looters and the ravages of war. Before
US and UN intervention, organized government services, such as police, water, fire, and
electric departments, at city and national levels ceased to exist. The ability to supply food
to the starving citizenry was negligible or nonexistent. Somalia became an international
"basket case", dependent on external aid to survive. Clan families, unable to resolve the
power issues, resorted to obstructing movement of relief supplies and extorting money
from relief agencies as an extension of the internal power struggle.
United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) was established in April 1992 to
provide a peacekeeping force to monitor a cease fire between the warring factions. By
July 1992, fifty observers were in place, concurrent with the start of UN relief shipments.
The U.S. began about the same time with Operation PROVIDE RELIEF by flying relief
supplies for non-governmental organizations (NGO) to southern Somali from Kenya on
US military cargo planes. In August, the UN Security Council authorized the expansion
of UNOSOM to four 750 man security units for the protection of humanitarian convoys
and food distribution centers throughout Somalia By late November, several nations had
agreed to provide observers, security personnel, and logistics support forces. However,
these early efforts proved largely ineffective as looting, extortion, and running battles
between clans continued Relief supplies were regularly diverted away from distribution
centers by thieves.
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It was against this backdrop that U.S. planning for the operation, Operation
RESTORE HOPE, began in mid-November 1992 The operation was conceived as a four
phased operation designed to secure the area for humanitarian relief efforts and then to
turn over control of the security operation to the UN forces of UNOSOM Phase I of the
operation involved deploying U.S. Forces to Somalia to secure the port and airfield
facilities of Mogadishu and Baledogle Phase II involved expanding the security area to
humanitarian assistance sites in Mogadishu and Baledogle. Phase III continued to expand
the security area to outlying regions of southern Somalia. Finally, Phase IV was the
hand-off of the security functions and responsibility to the UNOSOM forces.
The area of interest in Somalia is depicted in Figure 2. 1 . The modeling effort uses
the area depicted in Figure 2. 1 and the approximate deployment posture of the major clans
as of late 1992 The civilian populace is modeled using rough measures of the populations
for the major cities and regions in the area of operations The terrain model for the study
uses a node and arc network representation of the area of operations The detailed
description of the area of operations network can be found at Appendix A.
The forces considered for this study are limited to aggregations of the somewhat
homogenous groups The groups are explicitly modeled in the study as a separate and
distinct side The sides are Aideed Supporters, Aideed Clan, Neutrals, and U.S. Forces
The initial disposition of the forces for the scenario can be found at Appendix B. The
initial conditions for the study are now set with terrain and deployed forces There are
certain restrictions and assumptions needed to fully establish the initial conditions required
to properly represent the environment within Somalia in late 1992
As an aid to evaluating the decision making logic we will use the framework of an
existing research model known as the Future Theater Level Model (FTLM) This model
architecture is fully discussed by Schmidt [Ref 5] where he applies the model to a strictly






Figure 2.1. Southern Somalia
C. FUTURE THEATER LEVEL MODEL
Future Theater Level Model is a flexible model architecture under development at
the Naval Postgraduate School. The model uses a network representation of the terrain
consisting of nodes to model specific regions on the ground and arcs to model the mobility
corridors that connect the nodes. The model contains an air grid to model the airspace
over the network. The air model is capable of representing both rotary and fixed wing
missions. The air model incorporates a mission planner that selects the target for each
flight of aircraft from a list of potential targets and then develops a flight profile for that
mission that minimizes perceived threat from enemy air defenses. The model is unique in
its use of sensors to develop perceptions of the battlefield that can then be used by the
simulation in the decision making process. The sensor model uses Baysian updates to
build a posterior distribution for the configuration of enemy units at specific locations on
the network. This module is under revision to incorporate additional information
concerning unit movements and formations as well.
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The model for OOTW derived from the FTLM architecture is called the OOTW
Theater Level Model, OOTW-TLM. This model, OOTW-TLM, is capable of multi-sided
play. The number of sides is limited to a maximum of four at this time Within each side
there may be an unlimited number of factions. In the Somalia scenario a side would be
analogous to UN Forces and the factions could be U.S. Forces, Canadian Forces, and
Pakistani Forces. The sides have attributes, such as the hostility index, that describe the
interaction among the sides (e.g. side A may dislike side B but like side C). These
attributes are limited only by the imagination and ingenuity of the model developer.
Within the context of the simulation, the sides maintain perceptions and can share
perception information with other sides.
This model will eventually be used to study the decision making model
formulation. This will be accomplished by incorporating the logic into the existing model
framework and evaluating its performance. However, due to the current transition of the
FTLM model architecture from a C++ coded personal computer platform to a
SIMSCRIPT coded UNIX platform, the decision model will be tested independent of
OOTW-TLM for this study. After the transition is completed, the decision logic will be
incorporated into OOTW-TLM for testing. The construction of the existing model
architecture is especially well suited to the OOTW environment because of the use of
perceptions and the non-linear representation of terrain.
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III. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
Decision making logic is the heart of any descriptive model of human behavior It
is through the process of making decisions that the effects of human thought and action
can be seen, measured, and analyzed. The analysis of operations other than war missions
has been overshadowed in the past by the requirement to study high intensity combat
operations against the former Soviet Union. However, since the demise of the Soviet
Union and the emergence of the United States as the last remaining superpower, the
frequency and number of operations other than war missions has multiplied dramatically.
As President Clinton said during his commencement speech at West Point on 29 May
1993, "You will be called upon in many ways in this new era to keep the peace, to relieve
the suffering, to help teach officers from new democracies in the ways of a democratic
army, and still ... to win our wars." [Ref. 6]. The need to develop models to examine this
previously little studied area has grown to become a concern for many key leaders in the
U.S. Army. One of the most important elements of these models will be the embedded
decision making logic that accurately represents the unique requirements of the operations
other than war environment.
In operations other than war missions, as in any military operations, there is a
hierarchy of command and control relationships that define the decision making structure.
In the case of operations other than war there is the added dimension of a networked
coordination and control structure at the theater level. Figure 3.1 depicts the structure of
the usual decision making process in the operations other than war environment. The
networked decision structure is clearly visible at the Theater level of the diagram. This
networked structure, combined with the unusual factors for decision making, are what
makes decision making in operations other than war different from decision making in
standard combat operations. From the figure, the levels of decision making are fairly easy
to identify. These levels are the Strategic, the Operational, and the Tactical. The
Strategic level corresponds to the National Command Authority and United Nations level
decision making At this level the goals and objectives for the operation are formulated,
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as well as the restrictions that are binding in theater. The Theater level corresponds to the
decisions made in the theater of operations based on higher level (Strategic) guidance and
directives. This level includes frequent coordination and control among the various
United Nations
Strategic

























Figure 3.1. Decision Making Structure
agencies and the host nation. The lowest level is the Tactical level where units respond to
guidance and directives from the Theater level. Tactical level decision making is primarily
focused on unit responses to specific situations. This is analogous to action on contact
drills used by many units in the U.S. Army.
For this study the Strategic level of decision making will be considered fixed at the
start of the simulation. Thus, the restrictions and goals for the theater are known inputs to
the model. The areas of decision making we will focus on are the Theater and Tactical
levels. The primary focus at the Theater level is to determine the priority of effort to
achieve the strategic goal subject to the restrictions placed on the agencies by the Strategic
level decision makers. Once the priority of effort is determined, the next most important
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decision is how to allocate available resources against the prioritized efforts Thus, the
problem can be decomposed into two stages: prioritization of missions to accomplish the
strategic goal and then a resource allocation stage where resources are partitioned to
accomplish the missions Once the final stage is completed, the units execute the plan and
information concerning the success, failure, or problems encountered is reported back to
the tasking agency. On the basis of this new information and additional information
provided by other agencies, the mission prioritization and resource allocation begin anew
A. MISSION PRIORITIZATION
The wide variety of agencies active at the theater level creates a chaotic decision
making environment. These agencies have their own agenda and perception of what is the
most important mission to be accomplished at any time. To complicate the decision
making process further, these agencies are not in a hierarchical structure but are
networked. Within the network structure there are some links between agencies that are
formalized, such as the combatant commander and the ambassador, and others that are
formed as a matter of convenience to the agencies, such as the non-governmental agencies
and the ambassador. In this environment, the agencies must employ a wide variety of
behaviors in an attempt to further their point of view (perception). These behaviors can
take the form of coercion, negotiation, bargaining, and friendly cooperation Thus, a
major problem is how to deconflict the competing mission priorities of various agencies
and form a short and long range plan to attain the strategic goal
B. RESOURCE ALLOCATION
Allocation of resources toward specific missions is not a simple proposition in the
operations other than war environment. Once the agencies determine a prioritization of
missions, there is no requirement to provide the resources to execute this strategy. In this
environment, each agency usually controls some specific resource that is important to the
success of the mission but not readily available to the other agencies. For example, the
U.S. military controls the resources to provide security for convoys and feeding sites, the
Red Cross and U.S. Aid, two non-governmental agencies, control the vehicles, food items,
and feeding sites necessary for humanitarian assistance, and the host nation is sovereign
over its roads and terrain. Thus, all three agencies control a key portion of the resources
required to feed the starving populace effectively. By bringing these resources together,
the mission (feeding the starving people) can be most effectively conducted. However,
there is no requirement for the Red Cross or U.S. Aid to cooperate with the military.
They could hire local militia to protect their assets and then attempt to feed the starving
people.
In this case, the problem becomes more complex because specific resources can
combine in certain ways to produce the most desirable outcome, yet other combinations of
resources can combine to accomplish the same mission but at a lower level of satisfaction
Thus, a major portion of the problem is how to combine the resources of various agencies
to achieve specific missions and then to measure the effectiveness of these combinations.
C. KNOWLEDGE FUSION
The collection of information from a variety of sources is very important to the
decision making process at the theater level. Each agency has its own sources of
information that helps to build its perception of the current state of the theater. Based on
this perception, the agencies form opinions as to the most desirable prioritization of
missions and their expectation of the effects of accomplishing these missions. The diverse
data feeders in this environment range from reports by civilians to aid workers to satellite
data from military intelligence sources. Each agency has at its disposal some subset of this
spectrum of data collection. This diversity causes one of the first problems in building a
perception for each agency — how to integrate a wide variety of information sources into a
vector to describe the current world state as perceived by the agency.
Each agency determines what portion of the information it collects will be made
available to others and what portion will remain unshared. Besides the problem of fusing
the data into a state vector, we have the additional problem of parsing information into
categories by each agency. The separation of data by an agency may be specified by type
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of information and which agency to allow access to that type information. As a result,
agencies can use their own knowledge of the state vector to influence other agencies'
perceptions of the world state This issue further defines the problem of knowledge fusion
into how to form a perception of the state vector and use this perception to influence other
agencies' decision making processes
D. UNIT DECISIONS
The tactical level of decision making in the operations other than war environment
is an important portion of the decision making structure. Actions by small units can
significantly affect the perceptions of the host nation, U.S. citizens, and the world. The
decisions of a unit when faced with a iage mob of civilians, an armed band of militia, or
other hazards has far ranging impacts beyond the immediate effects of casualties or
mission failure. Thus, the problem is how to model the decision making process of small
units when faced with certain problems and how to propagate the effects of these
decisions throughout the model.
E. CONCLUSION
The problem of modeling decision making in the operations other than war
environment can be viewed as a three level process. The decision levels are composed of
the Strategic (known inputs to the model), Theater (mission planning and coordination),
and Tactical (actions on contact). We will focus on the Theater and Tactical levels of
decision making for this study. In the Theater level of decision making the problem can be
broken into three issues.
How to prioritize missions among the conflicting demands of agencies.
How to allocate resources from these agencies.




IV. REVIEW OF LITERATURE
According to Luce & Raiffa [Ref. 7], in all of man's written record there has been a
preoccupation with conflict of interest. This preoccupation has become one of the
dominant concerns for several academic areas: economics, sociology, political science,
operations analysis, and others. This has led to the development of numerous approaches
to modeling conflicts of interest among individuals and among institutions. We will
restrict our study to those areas which are mathematically rigorous and computationally
feasible. This restriction narrows the field of choices to several broad categories of





Each of these will be thoroughly examined in the following sections
Luce & Raiffa [Ref 7] divide the field of decision making according to whether a
decision is made by an individual or a group and then whether it is effected under
conditions of certainty, risk, or uncertainty. They argue that the division of the field by
individual and group decision making is not a biological-social distinction but a functional
one. Thus, an industrial organization can be considered an individual in competition with
other similar organizations or as a group composed of competing departments. They
define decision making under certainty, risk, and uncertainty as follows:
Certainty if each action is known to lead invariably to a specific outcome. Risk if each
action lead to one of a set of possible and specific outcomes, each occurring with a known
probability. The probabilities are assumed to be known by the decision maker.
Uncertainty if either action or both has as its consequence a set of possible specific
outcomes, but where the probabilities of these outcomes are completely unknown or are
not even meaningful [Ref. 7: p. 13].
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From these classifications, they show that utility theory is concerned with individual
decision making under risk. They then argue that conflicts of interest are ideally a
problem of individual decision making under a mixture of uncertainty and risk, uncertainty
arising from the ignorance of what the others will do. They propose game theory as a
means by which the idealization of the problem reduces it to one of individual decision
making under risk.
The idea of uncertainty in decision making lead to the development of statistical
methods for making decisions even when the state of the world is unknown. This lead to
the development of probabilistic models of decision making. The most notable model in
this field is Baysian inference. Pearl [Ref 8] explains the foundations of Baysian methods
and develops these techniques for use in decision making problems.
The problem of group decision making is concerned with the complex interactions
of preference patterns among individuals and how to amalgamate these patterns into a
composite pattern for the group. Bartos [Ref 9] uses the concept of dominance
relationships in conjunction with a mix of Markov chains and game theory to tackle this
thorny problem.
The final area of interest is used to model the group interaction process as well as
the cognitive problem solving processes of humans. This field is knowledge based or
expert systems which uses artificial intelligence solution techniques to create a model of
the human decision making process. Several approaches will be examined including
applying uncertainty measures to knowledge and inferences from that knowledge and
using distributed agents to negotiate the solution to a problem.
A. DECISION THEORY
The major premise behind decision theory is that people have certain preferences
among various rewards. We can view a decision as a tree, where at each fork we must
decide which path to follow, and if we can predict the outcome for following a certain
path, we can project the preference function over the outcomes and choose the preferred
outcome. In most cases the reward is known as utility that is gained from choosing a
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specific path through the decision making process Utility is most often measured in
dollars or some other universally transferable commodity. The concept of utility underlies
a large portion of the research in this and most subsequent fields
In their discussion of decision theory, Luce & Raiffa [Ref 7] develop the
underlying concepts of utility theory and argue for the principle that people behave
according to an expected value process. The concepts are based on the notion that
decisions are like gambles where any one of n outcomes are possible, each outcome is
worth a,, a,, ... , a
n
dollars, respectively, and the probabilities of these outcomes are p,, p.,,
...
, pn . Then, as shown in Equation 4.1, the monetary expected value of the gamble, b, is
b = aipi+a 2p2 + ...+a„p„ (4.1)
and the fair price for the gamble is the expected value, b. However, this simplistic
approach is shown to be flawed by explaining the St. Petersburg paradox of D. Bernoulli
The paradox is the proposition of a gamble where a fair coin is tossed until a head
appears The gambler is then paid 2 n dollars if the first head appears on toss n Based on
the aforementioned expected value argument, the gambler should be willing to pay an
infinite sum to participate in this gamble since the expected value is infinite. This does not
make good common sense. They then propose the solution offered by Bernoulli that
people behave according to the expected intrinsic worth of the gamble. The major point
here is that people behave according to an expected value of utility gained rather than
according to the monetary value of the gamble.
Luce & Raiffa then propose the von Neumann and Morgenstern approach to
developing the utility function for an individual. The assumption made is that if a person
can express preferences between every possible pair of gambles, where the gambles are
taken over some basic set of alternatives, then he can introduce utility associations to the
basic alternatives in such a manner that, if he acts according to expected utility, he is
acting according to his own tastes. This assumes his tastes are consistent Another way
to state this is that the preference relations are transitive. Luce & Raiffa then enumerate
29
the six axioms that must be satisfied to form the utility function. The most important of
these is that the preference relationships must be transitive; any gamble must be
decomposed into its basic alternatives according to the rules of probability calculus; and
that if A is preferred to B and B to C, then there exists a gamble involving A and C which
is judged indifferent to B. Their discussion is limited to linear utility. They conclude with
some suggestions on deriving the utility function for an individual through
experimentation.
Fishburn [Ref 10] is critical of the linear utility approach because experimental
evidence indicates that people's reasoned judgments often violate the basic axioms of
expected utility. He categorizes the criticisms of linear utility theory as descriptive and
normative. He defines these categories as:
The descriptive approach seeks to identify patterns in an individual's preferences or actual
choices and, subsequently, to develop a model that characterizes these patterns and which
can be used to predict preferences or choices not yet revealed.... Descriptive theory is
interested in actual choice behavior rather than in guidelines or criteria for "right"
decisions... The normative approach is concerned with criteria of coherence, consistency,
and rationality in preference patterns that, as in linear utility theory, are often set forth as
axioms... Applications of normative theory should entail careful reasoning and evaluations
so that it is imperative for a "right" decision to be carried out properly [Ref. 10: p. 26].
His primary criticism is in the common violation of the axioms of linear utility theory.
Primarily the independence axiom and the commonly observed preference reversal
phenomenon. His major point here is for a normative model, certain axioms must hold.
These are the reduction principle, asymmetry of strict preference, and first degree
stochastic dominance. He proposes the use of nonlinear utility tailored to the specific type
problem encountered and the desired utility measure. His proposals cover everything from
minor relaxations of linear utility theory which still preserve linear utility to nonlinear
utility measures which account for independence violations.
Utility theory is a critical pillar of decision theory. As such, it underlies the
majority of the solution methodologies in all areas of research. While the theory is not
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perfect in describing human behavior and it is difficult to obtain accurate utility mappings
from people, there is still a great deal of worth in developing utility functions for use in
our model.
B. GAME THEORY
Luce & Raiffa [Ref 8] develop the use of games in decision making from the basic
two-person zero sum game through two-person non-zero sum games to n-person games
The development of n-person game theory is an important consideration for our model,
due to the large number of agencies involved in decision making. The normal form of the
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It is assumed that each player knows the entire structure of the game in normal form and
each is driven by an inflexible desire to maximize expected utility. They develop the idea
of behavioral strategies where the player defines a probability distribution over the
alternatives of each information set. The problem of collusion among players and methods
to address this behavior are developed. Issues concerning bribes and pre-play
communication are discussed and limitations in the theory become more evident. From
this discussion the most promising approaches for our application appear to be:
Games with solutions
Games with \y-stability
Games with solutions are games that allow bribes
,
have full pre-play communication,
allow correlation of strategies in coalitions, and have transferable utility. Games with
i|/-stability are games that allow bribes, have partial pre-play communication, allow
correlation of strategies in coalitions, and have transferable utility.
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The games with solutions require that a concept of imputation 1 dominance be
developed whereby a definition of a solution is given as a set, A, of imputations such that:
If x and y are in A, neither x nor y dominates the other.
For any imputation z not in A, there is at least one x in A such that x dominates
z.
The major argument against the solution method is the question of multiple solutions and
how to choose the one that is played. Their proposition is to reiterate von Neumann and
Morgenstern's position that this is outside the framework of the game. Games with
U/- stability are games with a solution that differs from the solution discussed previously.
In this case a solution is defined as an imputation and a coalition structure. One
characteristic of these type games is that the equilibrium arises from strategic possibilities
as well as from communications limitations. There are three major shortfalls in this type
game:
The v|/ function is not generally explicit in social situations and no theory exists
for determining it.
The instable pairs are not generally unique and we have no method by which to
choose one solution.
Players are assumed to have far too limited future vision which induces
improbable behaviors.
The discussion of group decision making is developed by Luce & Raiffa [Ref. 8]
by demonstrating the many problems with ' mapping many individual preference functions
into one societal function. Several methods were demonstrated to overcome these
problems including Nash's development of bargaining in a social context, establishment of
a common unit and base of reference, and using roles of individuals to develop potential
orderings of values for the group. Bartos [Ref. 9] develops the Nash idea fully and offers
a rich explanation of the major divergence of Nash and traditional game theory. Nash
proved that an equilibrium solution exists for games where each player is maximizing their
1
Imputation- solutions to the game that are consistent with rationality rules and
which preserve Pareto optimality.
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payoff given the behavior of the other players. However, multiple equilibria cause the
Nash solutions to fail just as the n-person game models fail. Eichberger [Ref 11]
proposes using the Nash equilibrium model and solution method, then using learning to
guide the player's decision making when he plays the game the next time. This method
holds promise if the learning behavior can be accurately captured and modeled in a
complex system.
Game theory holds some promise for developing the decision making logic for our
model. However, one major problem underlying game theory is the requirement to
enumerate all possible outcomes and strategy sets available to each player as well as
identify the appropriate utility functions and probability vectors over the outcomes.
C. PROBABILISTIC MODELING
Pearl [Ref. 8] develops the use of Baysian inferences to drive decision making by
developing a Baysian network2 and applying facts until an effect is observed. The effect is
a probability distribution across a set of potential outcomes. For a complete discussion of
Baysian updating, consult a Baysian statistics or probability theory book. If we imagine
the network to be a still pond and new information a pebble, the propagation of the
knowledge in the network is like dropping the pebble into the lake. Pearl develops a
conceptually strong model for propagating beliefs in a causal network. He explicitly
develops methods for coping with typical network problems such as looping and
demonstrates techniques for propagating beliefs through a variety of network structures
and combinations. Neapolitan [Ref. 12] develops a similar model but does so more from a
mathematic point of view. He includes a very complete set of algorithms for implementing
this model. He goes to great lengths to rigorously develop the theory and explain the
rational for using this technique in conjunction with an expert system.
This methodology offers a means for determining probable outcomes from
information that is uncertain By combining this idea with either a knowledge based
2
Baysian network- a directed graph of dependency representations among a
collection of variables.
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system or a game theoretic approach, we can place probability distributions over the
outcomes of a game or develop beliefs (perceptions) of the state of the world.
D. KNOWLEDGE BASED SYSTEMS
Knowledge based systems are designed to capture the intricacies of human
cognitive abilities and apply them to a large variety of problems. The general form of a
knowledge based system is for the system to have a database of information, knowledge,
and a set of logical operators to probe the database and reach conclusions. Based on the
conclusion reached, actions can be taken or further analysis can be done. As in the
probabilistic approach, new data added to the database has the effect of propagating
throughout the system.
One specific area which has potential for our application is the use of multiple
intelligent agents to determine the solution to the problem. This field of artificial
intelligence is known as distributed artificial intelligence because the agents are usually
distributed over several processors
3
or the problem is subdivided and distributed over
several small problem solvers. Werkman [Ref. 13] develops a model for negotiating the
solution to a problem when the agents are attempting to cooperate. To resolve conflicts
due to perceptions, the agents share perception information which helps each agent
reevaluate his priorities based on the new knowledge. The negotiation is facilitated by a
negotiator agent who intervenes whenever the other agents become deadlocked. The
benefit of this approach is that it allows for an audit trail of cause and effect for each
decision made by the group. In addition, there is no need to enumerate all the possible
courses of action available to the system as it can potentially develop its own courses of
action from a limited set of primitives.
This approach would be beneficial for modeling the military staffs or the theater
level agents who are attempting to cooperate to solve the problem (e.g. UN mission or US
Country Team). Coupled with this idea would be to use the Baysian updating concept
discussed above to build probability distributions to reflect the uncertainty of the situation.
' This allows parallel processing to occur.
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This is very attractive due to the Baysian updating which is already incorporated into the
model The concept of utility will need to be used no matter which approach is used
Through the utility function we can valuate the potential solutions for each player At the
very least this will help to identify areas of conflict that must be resolved. Modeling the
cooperative agents (coalitions) with distributed artificial intelligence techniques and
negotiation coupled with the Baysian belief propagation could help circumvent the
problems inherent with n-person game theory. Finally, to capture the decision making
process of the opposing forces we could consider the use of two-person games where
each player in that game is a group of people who have already negotiated their courses of





The proposed decision making model is largely based on the concepts of decision
theory, including multi-attribute utility, and structuring the problem as a decision tree.
The overall model structure is as follows:
The DM determines the relative weights of the attributes used in his
multi-attribute utility function.
The weights are checked for consistency and are used to build a composite
utility function.
The sensor model observes each node in the theater to build a threat and a
civilian aid requirements forecast for each node.
Based on the forecasts and applications ofBayes rule, decision probabilities are
calculated and applied to the appropriate decision tree.
Based on the forecasts, expected outcomes are calculated on each branch of the
decision tree.
Utility values for each outcome are calculated.
A rollback algorithm solves the decision tree using a maximum expected utility
criteria for the optimal course of action (COA) at that node.
The process is repeated for each node in the theater resulting in a list of
potential COAs for each node and the expected utility attained by executing
that COA.
The final course of action is determined by applying the resource constraints to
the list of node COAs.
The plan is executed in the model and actual results are calculated
The forecast model and world state are updated.
The process reiterates for the next planning cycle.
The decision model is designed to replicate the decision making process at the theater staff
level. The same decision structure is appropriate for any single side in the theater as long
as the appropriate modifications are made to the attribute ranks and the forecasts.
1. Assumptions
The model makes a variety of assumptions in several key areas. The majority of
these concern the development of the utility model which constrains the final form of the
multi-attribute utility function to an easily manageable form. To aid in the understanding
37
of the assumptions, they are categorized by the application domain and their effect on the
model is explained.
The appropriate form of the utility function in each attribute for the DM is in
the form of a logarithmic non-linear function. This implies the DM exhibits an
increase in risk aversion as the payoffs increase in each attribute relative to the
DM's reference scale.
The DM's preferences across the utility attributes follows the Von Neumann
and Morgenstern axioms for preference. This implies the DM should choose
among alternative COAs using an expected utility criterion.
The DM's preference rankings among the attributes exhibits mutual preferential
independence. This implies the DM's ranking of the attributes remain
unchanged when considered in combination.
The Lanchester model of attrition using the square law is appropriate when
considering any non-ambush type combat action by one side against another.
This implies that the sides will use aimed fires during direct fire combat and they
want to minimize collateral damage to civilians.
The Lanchester model of attrition using the mixed law is appropriate when
considering any ambush type combat action by one side against another when
no civilians are present. This implies the side caught in the ambush will apply
unaimed fire during the ambush.
The DM's relative ranking of his desire to minimize collateral damage to
civilians can be used to modify, decrease, the attrition rates for that side from
their maximum value when civilians are present. This implies that eachDM
enforces more stringent rules of engagement when civilians are present, relative
to his desire to prevent civilian casualties.
The attrition rate for civilians due to starvation can be calculated as a function
of their current supply and health status. This function is a linearly decreasing
function in days of supply. This implies the civilian attrition due to starvation
and disease is variable based on their current state of supply.
The Bonder-Farrell approach to estimating the attrition coefficients for each
side is sufficient for determining an appropriate attrition coefficient. This
implies that the only data required to compute the attrition rates for each side
are the aggregated probability of a single shot kill and the approximate
exposure time required to acquire and shoot at a target.
Any COA combination planned can be completed during the planning cycle for
the model. This implies that all executed COAs begin at the same time after the
planning cycle is complete and no new missions are started until all previous
missions are completed.
Assumptions for data elements include:
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Probability of a single shot kill for U.S.= 0.7 and OPFOR= 0.6.
Exposure Time to fire one shot = 5 seconds.
Exposure Time to acquire target (minimum) 10 seconds.
Exposure Time to acquire target (maximum) 60 seconds
Lethal Area of a Round = 2.0 square meters.
Target Area = 10,000 square meters
Civilian Consumption Rate = 2 pounds per person per day.
Civilian Starvation Rate = 0.005
Minimum Aid Delivery = 7 Days of Supply
2. Limitations
The model is limited in scope and problem domain. These limitations are
mainly concerned with the problem domain and the level of detail present. The limitations
are listed with no explanation concerning their impact on model performance except where
the limitation is seen as potentially problematic.
The model is applicable to OOTW contingency operations in general and
humanitarian assistance missions in particular.
The model considers only five attributes in the formation of the multi-attribute
utility model. These attributes were chosen to capture the essence of the
conflicting demands in the humanitarian assistance mission area.
B. FORECASTS
One of the major conceptual underpinnings of the model concerns the use of
forecasts to predict the threat and civilian aid requirements for each node. The forecasts
are used so that the model does not make decisions under certainty. The decision logic is
insulated from the ground truth model state by the forecasts. The forecasts are discrete
probabilities that a particular state of the world will be attained once a course of action is
implemented The concept of the forecast is examined using the threat forecast as an
example and the structure of the civilian aid requirements forecast is presented without an
in-depth discussion of the development.
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1. Threat Forecast
The threat forecast is a probability forecast to predict the level of threat
anticipated at a particular node coupled with a perturbed estimate of the enemy strength at




The forecast is initialized with each state; / = 1, 2, 3; being entirely predictive of
the end state. The number of samples used to seed the forecast is predetermined by the
user. Four samples for the model runs are used for the analysis of the model. This
parameter is important because as the number of samples increases the rate of change in
the forecast decreases. Thus, there is an expectation that there is some finite upper bound
on the size of this parameter. The forecast then collects data on the actual state of the
node, if determined during a planning cycle, and updates the probabilities as appropriate.
A sample of the forecast can be found in Table 5.1. In the table, TA represents the actual













1. Hostile 0.25 1 1 1
2. Possibly
Hostile
0.5 1 1 2 0.5
3. Not Hostile 0.25 1 1
Total Samples 2 2 4
Table 5.1. Initialized Threat Forecast, N=4
The probabilities in columns two and six are the marginal probability of the
forecast state i being attained, and the probability of the threat being hostile given a
forecasted state. These probabilities are used in the decision tree to formulate the
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expected utility on any branch of the tree. As the forecast is updated, the probabilities
change in accordance with Bayes rule and the laws of probability For example, if the DM
chose to actually send a unit to a node, the actual state of the threat at that node would
become known at that time. That is, the threat would either engage the unit or not. If the
DM sent the unit to that node and the threat was in fact hostile, the probabilities would be
updated as shown in Table 5.2.








1. Hostile 0.2857 2 2 1
2. Possibly
Hostile
0.4286 2 1 3 0.6667
3. Not Hostile 0.2857 1 1 2 0.5
Total Samples 5 2 7
Table 5.2. Updated Threat Forecast, N=7
The updates are calculated by applying the rules of total probability and Bayes'
Rule. Let the joint probability mass function of the threat forecast, TF, and the actual
threat, TA, be denoted by
Ptf,ta0,J) = Pr{7F = i, TA =/}, i e TF, j e TA
and the probability mass function for TF, p^ , has as its i-th element
/?tf(0 = Pr{ 7F=i}, ie TF.
(5.1)
(5.2)
This vector gives the relative frequency of each forecast and is found by summing the joint
probability mass function in Equation (5.1) across all values of j. The actual outcome,
TA, has a probability mass function, pTA , where the j-th element is
PTA<j) = *T{TA=j}JeTA (5.3)
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This vector gives the relative frequency of each outcome and is found by summing the
joint probability mass function in Equation (5.1) across all values of i. Using the
multiplicative law of probability, the elements of the conditional probability matrix P of a
particular outcome, j e TA, given a particular forecast, i e TF, pTA[rF(j|i) anc* the elements
of the conditional probability matrix F of a particular forecast, i e TF, given a particular
outcome, j e TA, Pi^ta^O) are obtained. These are given as
Pta\tf (j\i) = , tt: —j—^r, i e TF andj e TA (5.4)
and




ll?(k ,v l G TF *ndJ gTA - ^5 - 5 )t-'keTF Ptf.ta \k ->j)
The P matrix is known as the decision probability because these are the probabilities that
will be used in the decision tree by the DM. The F matrix is the likelihood of the forecast
given a certain outcome. Applying Bayes 1 rule results in the following relationships:
PmrAm = """tly™ , i e TF andy g TA, (5.6)
and
The joint probability, that a particular forecast will be made and a particular
outcome of hostile or not hostile will occur, can be estimated by dividing the entries in the
body of Table 5.2 by the total number of samples, seven. From the row sums the marginal
probability mass function ofTF is determined to be
Ptf = (0.2857, 0.4268, 0.2857). (5.8)
Similarly from the column sums, the marginal probability mass function for TA is
pM = (0.71, 0.29) . (5.9)
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These are the fraction of the time the threat was hostile or not at this node. The decision
probabilities pTA|TF(j|i) are found using Equation (5.4) and are partially shown in Table 5.2.
The threat forecast is sensitive to the value chosen for the initial sample size. If,
in the example the forecast were seeded with 20 samples the outcome after the update
would be as shown in Table 5.3. The result is a change of 0.0248 (0.2857 to 0.2609) in
the measure of the marginal probability of forecast state three and, more importantly, of
0.3333 (0.5 to 0.1667) in the conditional probability of TA, given the particular state
probability forecast TF. From this example it is easy to see how the change in sample size
could potentially alter the outcome of the decision making policy over the course of many
planning cycles. As a result, a sensitivity analysis must be done to determine an upper and












1. Hostile 0.2609 6 6 i
2. Possibly
Hostile
0.4783 6 5 11 0.5455
3. Not Hostile 0.2609 -i 5 6 0.1667
Total Samples 13 10 23
Table 5.3. Updated Threat Forecast, N=23
The final portion of the threat forecast is the measure of threat strength at the
node. This forecast strength value is used in the calculation of the expected payoff for
each possible course of action under consideration. The value is calculated by fitting a
normal distribution with a mean of the ground truth threat strength and a variance of 0.3
times the enemy ground truth strength This distribution is then randomly sampled, which
results in an estimate of the threat strength at the node with induced error. The error
induced is directly controllable by the value selected to represent the variance of the
normal distribution This variance can be manipulated by the user to represent a variety of
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intelligence gathering capabilities or assets. Care must be taken to insure that the fitted
distribution does not report a negative strength value. To prevent this, a safeguard has
been included that has the model draw another sample in the event the user has specified a
large variance, which results in a negative threat strength at the node.
This results in a probability forecast at each node in the theater, and a threat
strength forecast. The probability forecast is updated as the DM implements COAs, and
the strength forecast is updated every decision cycle. Some of the probability forecasts
may never be updated if the DM never physically enters the node concerned. The strength
forecast should remain highly correlated to the actual threat strength on the node, even as
the threat strength numbers fluctuate through combat and reinforcement.
2. Civilian Aid Requirements Forecast
The civilian aid requirements forecast is fundamentally the same as the threat
forecast. It has different states and added criteria for how the forecast is updated during
the decision cycle and after delivery of aid. A sample civilian aid requirements forecast is
shown in Table 5.4. The determination of the criticality of the need is based on the
number of days of supply the civilians have at the time of the forecast. If the civilians have












1. Critical 0.3462 2 7 9 0.2222
2. Possibly
Critical
0.3462 2 7 9 0.2222
3. Not Critical 0.3077 1 7 8 0.125
Total Samples 5 21 26
Table 5.4. Sample Civilian Aid Required Forecast, N=26
The civilian status will be known with some certainty after a DM sends a unit to
a node. If the unit delivers some aid, the status of that node will likely become less critical
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than before the unit arrived. As a result, the forecast will necessarily need to be adjusted
in the next evolution by incorporating the knowledge that the unit has delivered a number
of days of supply to the node. To achieve this, the forecast is reset to the initial state and
n, the number of days of supply delivered, samples are added to each cell in the not critical
column. As a result, the forecast is adjusted to represent the number of days supply the
U.S. forces believe they left in place
The updating of the forecast during the normal decision cycle differs from that
of the threat forecast Because the cnticality of need is dependent on the amount of time
between aid deliveries, these forecasts will be updated on every decision cycle in two
ways The first case, if aid has not been delivered previously, will be accomplished by
adding one sample to each cell of the critical column of the table on each decision cycle.
The second case, if aid has been delivered previously, will be accomplished by
decrementing the critical column by one on each decision cycle until the forecast is at its
original state After this state is reached, the critical column is incremented by one on
each decision cycle. This technique will insure the sensitivity of the forecast to changes in
the perceived aid requirements at a node. Thus, the consumption of aid by the civilian
populace is captured in the forecast as a function of time (decision cycles).
The civilian strength is forecast in the same manner as the threat strength value,
however, the updating of the threat forecast is done in a different manner. The threat
forecast is updated during any decision cycle a friendly unit arrives at a node. The update
is accomplished by adding one to the hostile column if the unit is attacked or one to the
not hostile column if not attacked. This estimate is used in the projection of the utility for
assisting these people. Again, the same caveats apply as to arriving at a projected strength
less than zero, and on determining the parameter value for the variance.
Once the forecasts are calculated, the results are applied in determining the
optimal decision and the expected utility gained from following a specific COA at that
node. The forecast probabilities are used in the determination of the level of uncertainty
inherent in following a specific COA. The strength forecasts are used to determine the
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expected utility gained from following that COA and encountering the projected strengths.
This leads to a discussion of the decision structure required to build the decision trees
used to solve the problem.
C. DECISION STRUCTURE
The decision to follow a specific COA can be thought of as a series of events and
information in time that lead to a specific outcome. A commonly accepted manner of
representing this type of problem is through the use of influence diagrams and decision
trees. The influence diagram depicts a sequential development of information and events
that converge to realize an outcome. In these diagrams, random events, like forecasts, are
depicted using a circle. Decision opportunities are represented as squares and outcomes
are diamonds. The decisions of interest here are limited to combat, aid, or ignore. The
flow of information and influence (dependency) is depicted by directed arcs. If the
problem is one ofwhat COA should be taken with respect to a certain geographic area, or
node, it can easily be formulated as an influence diagram to capture the elements of








Threat Forecast Actual Threat
Figure 5.1. Influence Diagram.
The flow of information and dependency is crucial to developing the appropriate
logic to solve the problem. In this formulation, the threat forecast is determined before
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the civilian aid requirements forecast. Together they influence the decision as to the
appropriate COA to follow The forecasts, in turn, influence actual realizations of the
threat and civilian aid requirements. In reality, the actual realizations condition the
forecasted values, but they are not known before the decision is known, and hence the
directed arcs from the forecasts to the realizations. The combination of the realized world
state, civilian aid requirements and threat, and the COA decision produces an outcome
which is translated into a utility result. These relationships can now be enumerated to
consider all possible combinations of forecast state, decision, and expected outcome.
From these combinations, the DM will pick that combination which results in his
maximum gain in utility.
The construction of the decision tree to solve this problem then becomes relatively
simple. Starting at the leftmost edge of the influence diagram, the states at each node are
enumerated until reaching the rightmost edge of the influence diagram. The problem now
becomes one of applying the probabilities calculated from the forecasts to the appropriate
arc of the decision tree. Once this is done, and the expected outcomes are calculated from
the utility function, the expected utilities from the rightmost edge of the decision tree, the
result nodes, to the leftmost edge, the threat forecast, are found. At each confluence of
branches the DM chooses the maximum utility from the converging branches to continue
calculations in subsequent branches. This method of calculating the expected utility is
known as the rollback, or foldback, algorithm. This algorithm guarantees the solution of
the path or paths that has the highest associated utility. The resulting path is the decision
policy for that node at that time.
In an attempt to reduce the complexity of this potentially lengthy calculation, this
study uses forecasted strengths to eliminate certain branches. If there is a prediction of no
civilians at a node, there is little use in calculating any result contingent on civilians being
present. The same logic holds when considering the threat strength forecast. As a result,
the influence diagram and induced decision trees are reduced in these instances, as shown

























Figure 5.2. Threat Only Influence Diagram And Decision Tree
The result of these calculations is an optimal decision, in terms of utility, for each
node in the theater. The COA is formed by noting the mission to be performed (combat,
aid, or ignore) and the required resources to successfully accomplish the mission. In the
case of a combat action (combat) the required resource is combat forces. As a result,
appropriate Lanchester equations are used to determine the expected force required to win
the engagement. This value becomes the minimal resource, in terms of soldiers, required
to succeed in engaging the expected threat strength and winning. In the case of the aid
mission, the resources are aid and combat soldiers for security. The aid required is
calculated based on the estimated civilian strength value and an assumed consumption

























Figure 5.3. Civilians Only Influence Diagram And Decision Tree
enough combat power to defeat an ambush. These COAs have an associated utility value
based on the outcome of the mission. This leads to the development of the utility
functions for the model.
D. UTILITY DEVELOPMENT
The development of the utility function for the DM is based on the utility theory
developed by Von Neuman and Morgenstern. The development of the utility functions is
based on the relative importance the DM places on the attributes of interest. In this case,
the following five attributes are considered:
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Friendly Casualties (FC)- The desire to reduce the exposure of friendly forces
to combat action.
Enemy Casualties (EC)- The desire to impose as much destruction on the
enemy forces as possible.
Civilian Casualties Due to Combat (CC)- The desire to reduce collateral
damage to civilians in any combat action.
Civilian Casualties from Lack of Aid (CA)- The desire to provide the
humanitarian assistance and reduce the suffering of the civilian populace.
Aid Delivered (AD)- The desire to provide aid to the civilian populace. This
attribute uses days of supply delivered as its basic unit of measure.
Some readers may question the inclusion of two attributes, CA and AD, which seemingly
measure the same quantity, civilian suffering. The rationale for including AD was to
attempt to quantify the more difficult aspects of the OOTW humanitarian mission. In this
case, the delivery of aid was used as a surrogate for any other quantity of interest. One
could just as easily substitute control of geographic regions This attribute is intended to
capture the idea of imparting some semblance of order to the country in question. Future
versions of this model could change this variable, to select an attribute to more closely
model the theater in question. The remaining attributes seem to be present in any OOTW
humanitarian assistance mission in a hostile environment.
The mode! described by Marshall and Oliver [Ref 14] is used to build the
multi-attribute utility function for the DM. It begins by assigning a separate non-linear
utility function to each attribute. Let R, be the set of possible results for attribute j where
j= 1, 2, ..., n. It assumes that a preference ordering is defined on each of these sets. Let u
s




be a relative weight assigned to attribute j.




rj. The scalar utility resulting from this vector
of attributes is
lKr)=£wjufa). (5.10)
In order for this decomposition of U(r) to hold, it must be assumed that there is a
transitive preference ordering defined on each set Rj
,
and that the attributes exhibit
mutually preferential independence. In addition, the weights w
}
must sum to one.
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To determine the utility function form, the DM's relative importance of attributes
must be captured To this end, pairwise comparisons of each attribute will be used to
derive the relative weights of the attributes. Consider the weights of the attributes, w and
the relative rankings of a pair of attributes, a
ir
If a nine point scale as shown in Table 5.5
is used, the relative weights associated with the attributes can be calculated. The use of
the nine point scale is based on the original work in the Analytic Hierarchy Process as
developed by Saaty [Ref. 15] and further improved by McQuail [Ref. 16].
Scale Value Interpretation
1 The attributes are of equal importance.
3 Attribute is slightly more important.
5 Experience or professional judgment show the
attribute is more important.
7 Attribute is demonstrably more important
9 Attribute is absolutely more important.
Note: Intermediate values 2,4,6.8 are used to show intermediate values.
Table 5.5. Nine Point Scale For Rankings
The Least Squares Fit (LSF) technique, as developed by Morin [Ref. 17], is used
to solve for the weight vector, w, for a given matrix A = [a
(J
]. The matrix A is a square
matrix (n x n) containing the pairwise comparisons of the attributes based on the nine
point scale. For any comparison a
u
= 1 and for A to be completely consistent, the a- entries
must meet the following criteria:
%=i- (5.ii)
A LSF expression that solves for the error between the weights and pairwise ratios is
(5.12)
Using the relationship a^w^ w
i
,
a more tractable, equivalent measure of error is
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n n 2
e(w) =ZZ (w, -a,jWj) . (5.13)
i=ij=i
The vector w that best fits an over-determined matrix (consistent or not) is the vector of
weights w that minimizes the error in the above equation subject to the constraint
tk{Wi = l. (5.14)
In the above constraint, the value of k, depends on whether the comparison matrix
is being used to derive probabilities or priorities. The attempt here is to obtain the
preference indifference probabilities of the DM between the riskless alternative and the
risky venture. Hence, the sum of the w
;
over all i is one, and as a result, the k
;
= 1 for all i.
Using the method of Lagrange Multipliers to solve for the best fit vector w, the
indifference probabilities for the DM are obtained. Hypothetical weights were determined
for this model.
Once the indifference probabilities are obtained, the construction of the utility
function for each attribute is accomplished by assigning a non-linear function to each
attribute over the range of outcomes. A logarithmic form of non-linear utility is used to
model the relative utility gained for each outcome in the sample space. The logarithmic
form of the utility function is used based on the argument posited by Marshall [Ref. 14]
that the logarithmic form exhibits a more appropriate risk aversion behavior as a function
of the payoff size. In essence, for payoffs that are small relative to ones total worth (in an
attribute), a DM is more likely to exhibit less risk aversion than if the payoff were large
relative to ones total worth. The logarithmic form of the utility function exhibits this type
behavior. For a complete explanation the reader is referred to the reference cited.
The form of the utility function used is taken from Marshall [Ref. 14] and is given
by
w(r) = tflog[l+Z>[gJJ,r<r<r. (5.15)
In this formulation, f is the best result and r is the worst result obtained in a given
attribute. For example, if there were 10,000 friendly soldiers in the theater, the best result
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in terms of friendly casualties (FC) would be and the worst result would be 10,000. By
setting r equal to the worst value it can seen that u(r)=0 for any values of a and b.
Conversely, by setting r equal to the best resuit, it can be shown that the following
relationship must hold:
a = _L_ (5.16)
log(l+2>) v J
In this case, the parameter a is completely determined by the parameter b. To determine a
suitable value for b, it is necessary to look at the ratio of marginal returns from an extra
unit of r near the worst value for r and near the best value for r. This ratio measures the
relative slopes of the utility function at f and r. 3 is defined to be the ratio of the slope of
the utility function at the worst level to the slope at the best level.
4
This leads to p = b+1
and the utility function becomes
U^ = bip > T- - r ^ (5 - 17 )
In this study, the utility functions are built for each attribute by determining the
values for (3, r, and r for a hypothetical DM. For applications of this model to real
problems, the values for (3 would be determined by questioning the appropriate DM.
Once these values are determined, the component utility functions for each attribute can
be formed, as shown in Table 5.6.
The composite utility function, U(r), is formed by combining the weights obtained
with the utility functions for the component attributes and summing the resulting utilities
for any given outcome. In order to evaluate the utility functions for a specific instance
(outcome), the expected number of casualties or aid delivered must be determined. To
this end, an appropriate attrition model to obtain the expected numbers of casualties in any
given instance must be derived.
Another way to view the parameter (3 is as a measure of risk aversion as P gets
larger the DM is more willing to accept risk.
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Due to Lack of Aid
(CA)
5 500 ln [ 1+4 *rjoo]/ln5
Civilian Casualties
Due to Combat (CC)
5 500 ln [ 1+4 *^]/ln5
Aid Delivered (AD) 6 30 In
_
i t J 30
_
/ln6
Table 5.6. Utility Function Forms 5
E. ATTRITION MODEL
The development of the attrition model used in this model is based on the work
done by Lanchester as discussed by Lindsay [Ref. 18]. The environment in which OOTW
operations are conducted is significantly different from the environment under which the
original Lanchester equations were derived. As a result, various combinations of
Lanchester equations are used to fit certain hypothetical engagement types. For these
purposes, consideration is given to combat actions against enemy forces with civilians
present, combat actions against enemy forces without civilians present, aid deliveries with
civilians present, and aid deliveries without civilians present.
The development of the attrition model is based on the premise that when civilians
are present, the friendly forces will be constrained in their application of force by some
rules of engagement (ROE). To capture the effect of these ROE on the friendly forces'
ability to bring their firepower to bear on the enemy, the attrition coefficient for the
friendly forces attriting enemy forces is modified as a function of the importance placed on
civilian casualties by the DM, and the maximum attrition coefficient attainable if civilians
The graphs of these utility functions can be found in Appendix C.
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were not present. A linear function is used to decrement the attrition coefficient based on
the value of the weight for CC. It is envisioned that as the ability of the friendly forces is
hampered by the presence of civilians, the ability of the enemy to engage the friendly units
is enhanced Based on this, some means of obtaining appropriate attrition coefficients
without considering civilians is needed and then these coefficients will be adjusted, based
on the DM's weight for CC.
1. Attrition Coefficient Determination
To determine the appropriate attrition coefficients, the Bonder-Farrell approach
as described by Hartman, Parry, and Caldwell [Ref. 19] is used. In this approach, the
attrition coefficient for one force attriting another in direct fire combat (aimed fires) is





Where T is the time for Y to kill X In this model, the simple independent repeated shots
model is used to develop the attrition coefficients for each side in the scenario. In this
case, it is assumed that Blue represents friendly units and Red represents hostile or enemy
units. Thereby, the form for the expected time for Blue to kill Red is developed as:
£[7] = * fl +£ (5-19)
where t
a
is the time for one Blue firer to acquire one Red target, t
s
is the time to fire one
shot, and P
ssk
is the probability of a single shot kill. Thus, these values are needed to
develop the attrition coefficients. It is assumed that P
ssk is fixed at 0.7 for Blue and 6 for
Red. The time to shoot at a target is assumed to be fixed at five seconds. The effect of
the civilian presence is captured by varying the time to acquire a target. This assumes that
when many civilians are present, the ROE will force the friendly units to spend a
significantly longer time to determine if the person they want to engage is a civilian or an




established. It is assumed that under ideal conditions, with no civilians present, Blue can
acquire a target in ten seconds. Under completely adverse conditions (numerous
civilians), Blue can acquire a target in 60 seconds. From this, the best and worst values
for the attrition coefficient ofBlue against Red, a^, are
&br =m = —hr = 0.0583 (best) (5.20)
and
a™ =m = -TTT = 00149 (worst)- (521 >
For Red attriting Blue, there is no penalty for the presence of civilians. However, it is
assumed that the Red force can attain, at best, the acquisition and firing times for Blue's
soldiers, and, at worst, he will take somewhat longer than Blue to acquire targets, thus the
attrition coefficients for Red attriting Blue, clrb , become
VRB =m = "TTT = 00546 (best) (5 -22)
and
i i
o.rb = -£= = —TTT = 0.0261 (worst). (5.23)
In this case, the best attrition coefficient for Red is the unmodified best case when civilians
are present and Blue is operating with a very restrictive ROE. Using the weight obtained
from the DM for CC, a linear function for the attrition coefficients as a function ofwcc is
formed. These linear functions are
and




a/?s(wcc) = a^ + wcc[&rb - a^J . (5.25)
Thus, as the weight for CC increases from zero, Blue's attrition coefficient
against Red is decremented and Red's attrition coefficient on Blue is incremented,
accordingly. This improvement in Red's attrition rate is due to the increased exposure
time for Blue due to the use of his ROE, as measured by w .
56
The attrition coefficient for Blue when using area fires is determined using the
methods described by Hartman, Parry, and Caldwell [Ref. 19]. Since Blue is using
unaimed fires, the calculation depends only on the lethal area of one round and the area of
the entire target. Because Blue will only encounter this situation with no civilians present,
there is no modification of this attrition coefficient. Assuming that a man, when fully
exposed, reveals a two square meter target, and that the target area is 10,000 square
meters, the area fire attrition coefficient becomes
This coefficient is multiplied by the number of targets in the engagement area to determine
the final coefficient used
To determine the attrition for civilians who happen to be caught in the combat
zone, a linear function in w
cc
is formed, as before. For the lowest attrition rate for Blue
against civilians, the lowest attrition rate for Blue is used and then reduced as a function of
the fraction of civilians present in the engagement area (node) Thus, the lowest attrition
rate for Blue against civilians becomes
';r'
aBC = Xam where X= T<^L, - <5 27>
The maximum attrition rate for Blue against civilians is taken to be the largest attrition
coefficient for Blue against Red, given as
oLbc = oLbr- (5.28)
Forming a linear function for the attrition coefficient of Blue against civilians yields
clbc(wCc) = &BC - wcc{olbc - uBCJ . (5.29)
Substituting the appropriate values into the above equations produces the final form of the
attrition coefficient as
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To calculate the attrition for civilians in a combat scenario, they are treated as
participating as targets only, and the Logarithmic Law form of Lanchester's equations is
used. This leads to the attrition of civilians being represented as
f = -Oacc. (5.31)
Now, the range of values for attrition coefficients for each side involved in combat have
been determined, as well as the method for determining civilian combat casualties.
2. Civilian Attrition Due to Lack of Aid
To determine the attrition of civilians due to starvation, an attrition coefficient
that is a function of the days of supply on hand is used. The basic form of the attrition is
given as
dt% = -d(DOS)C (5.32)
where DOS is days of supply on hand, and the function d(DOS) is a linear function,
d{DOS) - 0.005 - 0.005£>OS, < DOS < 1
.
(5.33)
Thus, the civilians begin to be attrited due to lack of food and medical aid when they have
less than one DOS on hand, and at a maximum rate of 5 per thousand. For example, a
civilian population of 10,000 with 0.5 DOS would lose 25 people due to lack of aid and
would consume their 0.5 DOS. The maximum rate of death was determined by the recent
casualty figures obtained from Rwanda where approximately 5000 people died daily out of
an estimated population of 1 million. Civilian attrition, of this fashion, only occurs when
their DOS level goes below one DOS on hand. When the DOS level reaches zero the
civilians are attrited at the maximum rate, 0.005.
3. Combat Attrition
The various engagement types must now be considered in order to determine
the types of combat and attrition rules to follow. In high intensity combat operations with
direct fire engagements, the Lanchester Square Law has been used extensively to model
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engagements. Here combat actions are modeled using the Square Law as a basis for
determining expected casualties. When no civilians are present, each side attrits using
their maximum attrition coefficient. When civilians are present, the attrition coefficients
are adjusted as discussed above, and casualties are assessed to Red, Blue, and civilians
From the state equations, it can be shown that in a fight to the finish, for Blue to win the
following inequality must hold
''*JW- (5.34)I
Thus, if no civilians are present, the maximum attrition coefficients for Red and Blue are
used and when civilians are present, the adjusted coefficients for Red and Blue are used,
and casualties are also assessed against the civilians.
In modeling the potential combat actions centering around aid deliveries, these
actions are modeled as ambushes The Deitchman's Mixed Law, as described by Lindsay
[Ref. 18], has been used as a model for ambushes. The major assumption concerning the
use of the Mixed Law concerns the behavior of the ambushed force. In the Mixed Law
formulation, the ambushing force uses aimed fires against the ambushed force, while the
ambushed force uses area fires against the ambushing force. This implies that the
ambushed force is spraying the area where the ambushing force is located This
assumption is satisfactory if no civilians are present. Assuming there are no civilians
present, the conditions under which Blue will win, if ambushed by Red is
A>^F (5.35)
where the attrition coefficients are the maxima for each side. However, if civilians are
present the use of the Mixed Law is questionable In this case, the Square Law is used
instead. This would indicate that the ambushed force must exercise restraint and attempt
to engage the attacking force while limiting the collateral damage to civilians. In this case,
equation (5.34) is used to determine the conditions under which Blue would win. In this
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instance it is necessary to modify the attrition coefficients, as described above, and assess
civilian casualties.
The assessment of civilian casualties in any of the combat scenarios depends on
the length of the primary engagement between Red and Blue. Using the state equations
and the terminating conditions, it cas be shown that the time to finish a battle, in the




} * lnf^l (5.36)
Here, YBP , is the breakpoint threshold for the Red force. In this model the threshold is
assumed to be fixed at 80% of the initial starting force. This means the Red force will
break contact when 20% of their force has been attrited. Because the civilians are not
likely to remain in a combat area long after the fighting begins, it is assumed that the
civilians exposure time will be limited to the first 2.5% of the battle time. Now, the
elements are in place to calculate the civilian attrition due to combat action.
The results of the attrition model are used as inputs to the utility function
described above. To obtain the expected number of casualties, the estimates for the
number of civilians and enemy forces located on a node from the forecast model are used.
Then, the appropriate attrition model to use is determined based on the branch of the
decision tree being evaluated. The minimal force required for Blue to win is determined
by using the winning condition equations described above. Finally, the expected casualties
are input to the utility function to determine the payoff for that particular combination of
mission and strength level. Once the utility is known at the result nodes on the decision
tree, the expected utility can be rolled back, and the optimal COA for that node can be
determined. This rollback methodology is described in the next section.
F. DECISION SOLUTION
To obtain the optimal decision for a particular node, systematic expected utility
calculations are performed from the result nodes to the origin node (TF). At each
terminus of branches on the decision tree, the maximum utility value must be picked from
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the candidate values to perform subsequent calculations. In addition, the path history
associated with that maximal utility value must be identified. By following this procedure,
the maximum utility value at the origin node and the path through the decision tree that
produced that result are found The multi-attribute rollback algorithm described by
Marshall [Ref 14] and Kirkwood [Ref 20 and Ref 21] is used to produce this solution
1. All Paths Algorithm
At this point, it is appropriate to introduce several sets and some new notation
to help in the development of the algorithm. Let set D(i) be the set of decisions and C(i)
be the set of chance outcomes (TF, TA, CA, CF). Furthermore, let h be a state, or
history vector that contains a list of nodes (chance or decision) and branches (outcomes or
alternatives) that uniquely identify a path leading from the starting node to node i. Since
there may be many paths to a given node, a set H, = {hj is associated with each node i
Assuming node i is reached via history h, , and then follows branch j, that leads to the next
node k Then the state vector at node k is given as hk = [h , (i , j)]. Thus, each element in
the history vector is a pair of numbers in which the first is a node number and the second
is a branch number The following algorithm generates all the path histories in the
decision tree (assumes the starting node is numbered as 1) and is as follows:
1
.
Define a set H, for each node and set H, = NULL (Empty Set) for all i
2. Set h, = NULL and H, = {h,}.
3. Consider the next higher numbered node. If at node i and i e D, each branch j with
j e D(/lh,) leads to a node k. Set hk = [h , (i, j)] and add it to Hk





(i, j)] and add it to Hk .
5. Repeat steps 2 and 3 for all chance and decision nodes to determine the disjoint sets H
r
The procedure terminates and the union of the H
t
sets contains all the paths in the tree.
Now, the outcomes can be calculated, and the rollback algorithm can be used to determine
the solution to the problem.
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2. Resource and Utility Level Determination
To calculate the utility outcome, the levels of each attribute considered in the
utility calculation must be determined. Previous discussion has shown how to calculate
the attrition values which go into the calculation of friendly casualties, enemy casualties,
civilian casualties due to lack of aid, and civilian casualties due to combat. Now, it must
be determined how to calculate the amount of aid to deliver in order to produce a utility
measure for this attribute.
When it is decided to provide aid to a group of civilians, a delivery of a
minimum of seven days of supply to the node is attempted. As a maximum value,
transport will include the maximum daily haul tonnage, which is a function of the
transportation assets available to the friendly forces. A daily haul capacity often tons per
vehicle per decision cycle is used. In each case, it will be attempted to provide the
maximum aid possible to each node requiring aid. In the event attempts are made to
provide aid beyond the capabilities of transportation assets, the aid delivered is reduced to
a feasible amount.
The inputs to the utility function for each attribute of interest can now be
calculated. From this, the payoff (utility) at each result node in the decision tree can be
obtained, and the rollback algorithm can be used to calculate the optimal decision for each
node.
3. Rollback Algorithm
Now, consider the situation where the payoff r^h,) for every branch j leaving
node i in the decision tree is some given value. Since every terminal node is at the end of
a single branch, it can be assumed that any payoff associated with a terminal node is
assigned to that single branch. The objective is to maximize the expected value v, at the
origin node. The following algorithm finds the optimal paths, decisions, and returns.
1
.







2. Find an unlabeled node i where all later occurring nodes k connected to it are labeled,
(a) If i e Dset v,(h,) = Max {r
;




(b) If i e C set v,(h,) = Z Pj(h,)[rj(h,) + vk(h k)].
;eD(/lh,)
Step 2 is repeated until the starting node is labeled. The starting node label gives the
maximum expected utility for the problem and the d*'s computed at each decision node
give the optimal decisions To aid in the formulation of this problem, the data for the
decision trees are collected in Appendix D.
Now, the basis for producing an algorithm to calculate the maximum expected
utility for each node, and the decisions that were used to obtain that utility value have been
developed In addition, the required resources to accomplish the mission are also known.
This procedure can be iterated over all nodes to determine the optimal COA for each node
and the resources required to accomplish this goal. From this it is possible to form a
theater wide strategy that maximizes total utility and achieve the theater goals.
G. THEATER COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT
Now that the optimal COAs are known for each node, these nodes can be ordered
by the utility value associated with the COA. By applying resource constraints, it can then
be determined which COAs are possible to execute in any given decision cycle. Any-
remaining resources are held in reserve and are available for future use. The COAs that
are resourced can be executed and the results of these actions observed.
Once the results of a set of COAs are known, the forecasts can be appropriately
updated, and start the planning cycle anew. From this methodology, answers to the
questions of how to develop a theater-wide COA with constrained resources has been
found. The method began by establishing the forecasts for the threat and civilian needs at
a node through the use of probability forecasts. The number of civilians and enemy at the
nodes were then estimated. Attrition models were used to determine the expected number
of casualties for a given set of decisions at a node. The utility associated with each result
node in the decision tree was then calculated, and the history algorithm was used to
determine all the possible paths in the decision tree. The rollback algorithm determined
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the optimal utility return, and the decisions associated with that value The node COAs
were ranked by the utility values obtained, and those COAs within resource limitations
were executed. Finally, the world state and the forecasts were updated, as required. The







The model was written in Borland's Turbo Pascal for Windows® version 1.5 and
is a Windows 3.1° application. It easily runs on any personal computer with a functional





The analysis of the model will be conducted using a two phased approach. The
first phase will use a series of one decision cycle runs with perturbation of input
parameters to evaluate the impact of these parameters. The second phase will use a series
of longer runs, 10 to 100 decision cycles, to evaluate the long run effect of the input
parameters on decision making. The ending conditions for the longer runs are: all nodes
with civilians have the days of supply (DOS) level specified for the theater, all friendly
troops killed, or all friendly trucks destroyed. The specified DOS level for the tests will be
30 DOS. This means the theater goal is for each node with civilians to have 30 DOS on
hand at the end of a decision cycle to end the simulation.
B. RESULTS
The model was run for ten replications of 100 decision cycles using two different
DM "personalities" to determine the capabilities of the model. The "personalities" used
were the humanitarian and aggressive commanders. The humanitarian commander was
primarily interested in distributing aid while minimizing friendly and civilian casualties.
The aggressive commander was primarily concerned with killing the enemy. The weights
used for the attributes for these DM cases are shown in Table 6.1. For each commander
type, there were two initial resource states considered; one with limited resources and one
with ample resources In the ample resources case, the initial forces were 10.000 troops
and 100 trucks. In the limited resources case, there were 1000 troops and 10 trucks. The
initial conditions for the world were the same for each model run. These initial conditions
can be found in Table 6.2.
1. General
In no instance was the model able to satisfy the termination condition for aid
when the standard input parameters were used. As a result, the model either stopped due
to the time or resource constraint being invoked. When the aggressive DM was used, the
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simulation terminated within 38 decision cycles because of friendly casualties. When the
humanitarian DM was used, the simulation terminated within 73 decision cycles due to
loss of vehicles. In every instance the humanitarian DM reached an equilibrium state, in
Attributes Humanitarian Commander Aggressive Commander
Friendly Casualties (FC) 0.44388 0.40698
Enemy Casualties (EC) 0.04073 0.40019
Civilian Casualties due to Combat
(CC)
0.2469 0.0437
Civilian Casualties due to Lack of
Aid (CA)
0.15254 0.04733
Aid Delivered (AD) 0.11595 0.1018
Table 6.1. Decision Maker's Attribute Weights
Node Number of Civilians Number of Enemy DOS On Hand
One 10,000 100 0.1
Two 10,000 1,000 0.1
Three 10,000 100 20
Four 10,000 1.000 20
Five 100,000 100 0.1
Six 100.000 1,000 0.1
Seven 100,000 100 20
Eight 100,000 1,000 20
Nine 50,000 500 20
Ten 50,000 500 8
Table 6.2. Initial World State
terms of civilian casualties, much sooner than the aggressive commander. The casualty
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These figures show the effect of employing the DM types in the ample resources
case. Notice that the humanitarian commander was able to reach a steady state, in terms
of civilian casualties, much sooner than the aggressive commander, and that the civilian
casualties were reduced to a much lower level by the humanitarian commander. An
interesting point is that the aggressive commander chose to aid certain nodes early during
the run but primarily focused on combat thereafter
The spikes of casualties seen on the humanitarian commander graphs are a result
of ambushes carried out by enemy forces on certain nodes. Notice that the spikes for
combatant losses on Figures 6.1 are much lower than those depicted in Figure 6.3. This
evidences the fact that the humanitarian commander only fought when he was attacked.
Also, note that the overall rate of civilian casualties is very low when compared to the
aggressive commander (Figure 6.2 versus Figure 6.4). It is interesting to note that the
humanitarian commander never chose to resort to combat except in self-defense, while the
aggressive commander only occasionally performed the aid mission.
The aggressive commander graphs clearly show the primary intent of this
commander, to kill the enemy. The smooth descent of combatant casualties and
concurrently high civilian casualty rate are a direct result of his priority in that area. The
occasional dips in civilian casualties are a result of the aggressive commander choosing to
aid the civilians at certain points during the run. The primary cause for the decrease in
civilian casualties over the run was due to their attrition suffered, which reduced the
civilian population available for attrition the next decision cycle.
One particular limitation of the model is pointed out by these results; the influence
of the DM type and the associated utility structure are so strong that the effects of the
forecasting model are apparently overwhelmed. For example, early in the runs the
aggressive commander chose to aid the civilians at certain nodes as shown in Figure 6.3 by
the dips for combatant casualties at decision cycles two and seven. Later when the
aggressive commander eliminated the opposing forces, he made no attempt to reduce the
civilian casualties by delivering aid until the available troops for combat strength was very
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low, four. This was due to the low weights associated with civilian casualties by this DM.
The impact of the civilian aid forecast probabilities going toward one, more critical, was
not strong enough to cause the model to begin to aid the civilians. This type result is
shown in Figure 6.5.
iNoue
Node = Six DOS Delivered 0.00
DOS= 0.00 Utility 0.6638
PercDOS= 0.17 Trucks Used
Perc Civilian = 6853
1
Troops Used 2
Perc Enemy = 3 Blue Losses
COA = Combat Red Losses
Executed = TRUE Civilian Losses 483
Outcome = Blue Wins Vehicle Losses
— Decision Probs — — Decision Probs —
Critical 1.0000 Hostile 0.0704
Poss Critical 0.6667 Poss Hostile 0.0694
Not Critical 0.5000 Not Hostile 0.0563
Figure 6.5. Sample Output Showing Preference Overpowering Forecast
2. Forecasts
The forecasts were tested by allowing the model to run for a long time, 100
decision cycles, and observing the effect of the growing sample size in the forecast. To
observe the effect of changing the variance of the strength estimate, the parameter was
varied over a range of values and changes in outcomes were collected. The assessment of
the impact of these values hinges on demonstrating cases where the number of samples in
a forecast caused problems in producing realistic output and on determining the value
where the variance changes the COA decision.
a. Forecast Sample Size
The forecast sample size did not impact on the predictive power of the
civilian aid requirements forecast, due to the updating scheme used. However, the threat
forecast did not use a multi-step update and tended to become very heavily weighted
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toward the prior distribution when the sample size grew much over 50. At that point, the
forecast was insensitive to any input which contradicted the prior distribution This was
most evident during the latter portion, after 50 decision cycles, of the long runs. In most
instances, the probability values in the civilian aid requirements forecasts tended to move
in response to the changing world state. The only exception, as discussed above, was
when the aggressive commander ignored the needs of the civilians for so long that the
prior distribution was firmly biased toward critical need. However, in this instance it was
appropriate for the forecast to be heavily biased.
b. Strength Estimate Variance
The strength estimate variance produced the expected result of reducing
the average number of casualties taken to accomplish the mission. The variance
parameter, a fractional portion of the mean used as variance size, was changed from to 1
in increments of 0.1. When the parameter is set at 0, the model produces completely
correct sensor reports and when set to 1, the reports are very error prone As the variance
parameter was reduced toward 0.1, meaning that the variance is 10% of the mean, the
accuracy of the strength values and DOS needed became increasingly accurate. This
allowed the resource module to more accurately predict what resources were required to
achieve the mission. When a fight occurred, blue was more likely to win the battle due
to the improved accuracy of the enemy strength estimate. This was clearly shown when
the humanitarian commander successfully completed the mission in 40 decision cycles
when the variance was set at 10% of the mean The values between 0.2 and 0.8 provided
similar results in terms of casualties over time. At the extreme ends of the scale used, the
results were significant enough to change the outcome of the model runs. This result is
shown graphically in Figure 6.6.
3. Utility Function Parameters
The utility function parameters evaluated are the attribute weights and the P
values for the individual attribute utility functions In evaluating the weights, the P values
were held constant at two and during the P value testing, the weights were held constant
?;
at 0.2. In each experiment, one model run was made for a decision cycle to evaluate the
impact of the parameter change. A common random number seed was used for each run
to duplicate the random effects between model runs.







Figure 6.6. Effect Of Variance Change On Friendly Casualties
a. Attribute Weights
The attribute weights were perturbed over the range to 1 in steps of
0.01. The evaluation method consisted of setting the weight of the attribute of interest
and then dividing the remaining weight equally among the remaining attributes. Finally,
the combinations of associated weights were considered to evaluate the effect of
combinations of weights. For example, the weights for civilian casualties are set to certain
levels to determine the synergistic effect of that combination. Due to the large number of
combinations possible, only selected combinations were explored. The results of this
analysis are shown in Table 6.3.
The friendly casualty weight was found to exhibit a strong tendency
toward selecting the Combat COA when set lower than 0.36 and toward selecting the Aid
COA when set higher than 0.36. Interestingly, when set at 0.36 the model chose a mixed
strategy of the Combat and Aid COAs. The enemy casualties weight was found to exhibit
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a strong tendency toward selecting the Aid COA when below 0.1 and toward selecting the
Combat COA when set above 0.1. As in the case of the friendly casualties weight, the
enemy casualties weight exhibited a tendency to select a mixed strategy when set at 0.1.
Attribute COA
Combat Aid Mixed
Friendly Casualties (FC) <0.36 >0.36 0.36
Enemy Casualties (EC) >0.1 <01 0.1
Civilian Casualties due to
Combat (CC)
<0 94 >0 94 0.94
Civilian Casualties due to
Lack of Aid (CA)
< 1.0 = 1.0 NA
Aid Delivered (AD) < 1.0 = 1.0 NA
Table 6.3. Attribute Weights Breakpoints For Coa Selection
The civilian casualties due to combat weight was found to exhibit a strong tendency
toward selecting the Combat COA when set below 0.94 and toward selecting the Aid
COA when set higher than 0.94. Again, the civilian casualties due to combat weight
exhibited a mixed strategy when set at 0.94. The civilian casualties due to lack of aid
weight was found to exhibit a strong tendency toward selecting the Combat COA when
set below 1 .0 and toward selecting the Aid COA when set at 1 .0. This is due to the strong
influence of the other parameter values toward the Combat COA The aid delivered
weight was found to exhibit a strong tendency toward selecting the Combat COA when
set below 1.0 and toward selecting the Aid COA when set at 1.0. Again, the impact of
the other parameters toward the Combat COA are too severe to overcome until they are
set to zero
Comparisons of associated weights consisted of three tests. The first
produced a set of weights for civilian casualties and distributing the remaining weight
equally among the remaining attributes The second produced weights for enemy and
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friendly casualties and distributed the remainder to the other attributes. While the third
produced a weight for civilian casualties and aid delivery with the remaining weight
distributed to the other attributes.
In the first test, when the weights for civilian casualties, wcc and wCA,
were set at a combined weight higher than 0.96, the result was a consistent decision to
choose the Aid COA. When the weights were set equal or less than 0.96, the decision was
the Combat COA. This result is consistent with the result obtained in the single weight
effects experiment.
In the second test, if the combined weights of wFC and wEC were set
greater than 0.1, the result was a unanimous decision for the Combat COA. If the
combined weights were set less than 0.1, the decision was in favor of the Aid COA.
Again, if the combined weights were set to 0.1, the result was a mixed strategy. This
result agrees with the expected results as indicated by the single weight effects experiment.
In the third test, if the combined weights ofwcc , wCA , and w^ were set
lower than 0.33, the result was the Combat COA. If set to 0.33 or higher, the result was
to choose the Aid COA. This result is entirely consistent with the second multiple weight





CC&CA <0.96 >0.96 NA
FC&EC >0.01 <0.01 0.01
CC. CA, &AD <0.33 >0.33 NA
Table 6.4. Multiple Weight Impacts On Course Of Action Decision
b. P Values
To test the impact of the (3 values, they were systematically varied from
2 to a large number (9.9E30). The steps used were 2, 10, 100, 1000, and 9.9E30. In
every instance the decisions were not impacted by changing the values of the (3's. The
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decision was consistent with the distribution of the attribute weights as noted above and
remained fixed no matter what level of (3 was used Thus, the model is insensitive to the
level of 3 used
C. APPLICATION TO SOMALIA DATA
Once the parameter testing was completed, the model was run using the data,
which is representative of Somalia, from Appendices A and B. The results of these runs
were very interesting. The humanitarian commander was able to quickly, within 45
decision cycles, reduce the civilian casualties to a very low level, but it took him 277
decision cycles to complete the mission. On the other hand, the aggressive commander
was able to subdue the enemy forces within the first 30 decision cycles, but was unable to
reduce the civilian casualty rate much below 200. The aggressive commander was unable
to complete the mission because of the high number of losses he sustained in the initial
combat reduced his ability to deliver aid. The insight gained through this cursory
examination of a sample scenario is beneficial in assisting the investigation of the dynamic
effect of mission priorities over a long planning horizon. From this analysis, it would
appear that the best overall plan for an OOTW mission would be to establish a goal of
providing the most humanitarian assistance possible early in the operation, and have a
strong reaction force to retaliate for any attacks made against our forces. This would
combine the best outcomes from each of the notional commander types by reducing the
civilian casualty rate quickly, while simultaneously providing a strong deterrent against any
potential attacks. The casualty data for these model runs are shown in Figures 6 7 and 6.8
and a comparison of the first 30 decision cycles' aid delivery rates is shown in Figure 6.9.
Note that the Y-axis scales are different on Figures 6.7 and 6.8.
D. CONCLUSIONS
The results of the model runs were adequate for a simple decision model using
very crude sensors. However, the model did tend to produce some unexpected results as
a result of the utility model construction. The model was not as sensitive to the forecasts
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as it needed to be and, as a result, the utility weights seemed to be the parameters that
drove the decision model to pick the COA for each node. Only occasionally, when the
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Figure 6.8. Casualty Trends For Somalia (Aggressive Commander)
the aggressive commander chose to aid a node while he had a large combat capability. In
general, his preference toward combat drove him to attack until his ability to continue the
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fight was nonexistent, and then attempt to aid the civilians. At that point, any residual
enemy forces could easily defeat his force and win the campaign. The most surprising
result was the insensitivity of the utility model to the 3 values. This is more evidence for
the overall conclusion that the model is really driven by the attribute weights; in particular,
the weights for friendly and enemy casualties.
Overall, the model results were believable given the quality of the forecasted
information. In the analysis of the Somalia data, the model produced some insights into
the interaction of priorities within this type operation. It was quite easy to observe the
model results and draw appropriate cause and effect conclusions from the output. The
casualty data are but one form of output available. The most informative data concerning
the decision making history are the node decision information as shown in Figure 6.5.
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E. FUTURE WORK
1. Forecasts
The forecast model needs to be improved through the addition of more realistic
sensors for strength and composition values. This sensor model should be directly related
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to actual sensor platforms in use in the OOTW environment. The probability forecast
could be enhanced by revising the updating scheme for the threat forecast as a minimum.
However, using a belief network approach would lead to a stronger formulation with
better connections to the sensor model. In this approach, the variables that affect the
determination of the threat probability vector could be linked together in a directed acyclic
graph. The evidence collected by the sensor model could then be inserted into this
structure which would then propagate through the network producing a new probability
vector. These improvements to the sensor model should enhance the face validity of the
model and produce more realistic results.
2. Utility Model
Improvements to the utility model must include the development of a more
sophisticated utility function form. The inclusion of a larger, more representative sample,
of attributes would be an excellent starting point. In addition, some form of penalty for
making a decision which results in a catastrophic failure should be included. This would
enforce a more averse decision making policy. As a result, the aggressive decision maker
would be forced to reduce his combat actions after sustaining a large loss in the field.
Further study to find the best form of utility function should be done. The logarithmic
form is suitable as a first approximation; however, there is a need for a convex function to
represent those attributes with very high utility values at one end of the scale and rapidly
decreasing values across the scale. The logarithmic form can only approximate a straight
line at one extreme and a severely concave function at the other.
3. Decision Model
The decision model could benefit by the inclusion of more forecast inputs and
additional COAs. The most critical and obvious choices were used to construct this
model. Improvements could easily be made through the use of additional forecasts such
as the host nation support forecast, or the allies support forecast to predict the popularity,
and hence, support from these players for the chosen COA. The addition of more depth
to the decisions available to the DM would add to the realism of the model. For example,
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the DM could make the decision to use sensors to collect more information from a node
before committing to any COA at that node. He could decide to employ a ruse or decoy
operation in an attempt to deceive the enemy forces, or he could decide to employ other
humanitarian or special purpose units in other specialized roles. All these additions could
be incorporated within the basic framework of the decision tree structure. The rollback
algorithm, as encoded, is well suited to solving problems in excess of one million
endpoints. The addition of continuous random variables within the decision tree would
also tend to smooth the response of the model to changing sensor and world state inputs.
4. Attrition Model
The attrition model could be improved by modifying the civilian attrition model
used to capture the effect of civilians in the engagement area. The current model produces
an increasing number of casualties based on the number of civilians on the node. Because
the node can represent a very large space, it is unrealistic to expect that all the civilians are
candidates for attrition if there is an ambush in the node. Further improvements could be
made by incorporating indirect fire attrition, including civilians, and aircraft munitions
attrition. This would allow the modeling of a wide range ofweapon systems.
5. COA Generation
The generation of the theater level COAs could be improved by performing an
optimization over some uncertain planning horizon. The optimization could take into
account the uncertainty of the success of the current COAs and make provisions for failing
to achieve the current goals. The main point here is that it does not always make sense to
commit every available resource every decision cycle. This is somewhat unrealistic, if the
planning cycle is short, and can lead to catastrophic results when the current COAs are
unsuccessful
Future work in developing this model for decision making could produce a very
realistic and accurate portrait of the issues and factors to consider in the OOTW
environment. The enhancements discussed would greatly improve the face validity of the
model and add a large amount of realism to the product
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APPENDIX A. NODE-ARC REPRESENTATION
A. INTRODUCTION
The data contained in this appendix are estimates from map reconnaissance and
what information is available on this subject. Figure A. 1 shows an near-scale drawing of
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Figure A.l. Node-Arc Network Of Somalia
B. NODE DESCRIPTIONS AND ATTRIBUTES
The physical nodes needed for the Somalia model are listed in Table A.I. The






= An arbitrary ID number for each node
= Name of town at node.
= Diameter of node in KM.
= (X,Y) coordinate on an arbitrary 35x35 grid.
This is used to assist in creating a scale map and to interface with the air grid. The grid
origin is in the lower left corner.
Node# Name Size Location
N3 Mogadishu-K4 circle 3 21,18
N4 Mogadishu-Airport 2 20,16
N5 Mogadishu-Seaport 2 22,16
N6 Mogadishu-East 2 23,18
N7 Mogadishu-North 2 21,20
N8 Afgoye 1 18,19
N9 Marka 2 17,15
N10 Marka-Seaport 1 17,14
N11 Baledogle 3 15,20
N12 Buur Hakaba 2 12,22
N13 Baidoa 3 10,24
N14 Baidoa-Airport 1 9,24
N15 Oddur 2 12,31
N16 Luuq 1 3,29
N17 Bardera 2 1,20
N18 Jilib 1 4,8
N20 Kismayo 3 2,2
N21 Kismayo-Airport 2 1,1
N22 Kismayo-Seaport 1 3,1
Table A.l. Node Attributes
C. ARC ATTRIBUTES
The arcs needed to build a model of Somalia are listed in Table A. 2. The arc
attributes needed to constructed the model are as follows:
Arc = An arbitrary ID number for each arc.
Nodes
Cap
= The terminus of each end of the corridor.
= Capacity of mobility corridor, by unit size (Width).
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Roads = Scale of number and quality of roads in corridor.
Terrain = Terrain type (open, hills, forest, urban, sea, etc.).
Cover = Aggregated % of cover across the arc.
Obstacles = Aggregated % of obstacles on arc.
Distance = Length of arc from node to node (KM).
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Arc Nodes Capacity Roads Terrain Cover Obstacles Distance
Head Tail
A1 N3 N4 CO 2 Urban .7 .05 1
A2 N4 N5 2 .7 .05 1
A3 N3 N5 3 .7 .05 1
A4 N5 N6 3 .7 .05 1
A5 N3 N7 3 .7 .05 1
A6 N6 N7 3 .7 .05 1
A7 N3 N6 3 .7 .05 1
A8 N3 N9 BDE 2 Open .05 .05 90
A9 N9 N10 CO 2 Urban .35 .05 1
A10 N9 N18 BDE 2 Open .05 .05 290
A11 N18 N20 BDE 2 Open .05 .05 110
A13 N20 N22 CO 2 Urban .40 .05 1
A14 N22 N21 CO 2 .45 .05 1
A15 N21 N20 CO 2 1 .45 .05 1
A16 N18 N17 BDE 2 Open .08 .05 300
A17 N17 N13 BDE i Open .05 .05 170
A18 N13 N14 CO 2 Urban .55 .05 1
A19 N16 N13 BN 1 Open .05 .05 150
A20 N16 N15 • 1 05 .05 150
A21 N15 N13 1 .05 .05 150
A22 N13 N12 BDE 2 .05 .05 90
A23 N12 N11 BDE 2 05 .05 80
A24 N11 N8 BN 2 .08 .15 20
A25 N8 N3 BN 2 .08 .15 70
A26 N20 N17 CO .10 .25 500
A27 N17 N16 BN 1 Hill .15 .10 150
A28 N15 N12 Open .20 .25 240
A29 N17 N9 i .05 .25 350
A30 N9 N8 i 1 1 .05 .05 70
A31 N13 N18 i .05 .25 400
Table A.2. Arc Attributes.
84
APPENDIX B. DISPOSITION OF FORCES
The following disposition of forces is for the civilian populace, the clans, and the
U.S.. The index numbers shown are for reference only and have no impact on play The
GREEN Force, shown in Table B.l, represents the civilian population that is friendly to
the Aideed clan The RED Force, shown in Table B.2, represents the Aideed clan that are
under arms and organized for combat against the U.S. The WHITE Force, shown in
Table B.3, represents the civilian population that is somewhat friendly or neutral to the
U.S. player The BLUE Force represents the U.S. Forces available for deployment to
theater and are therefore not located on a node within Somalia.
The personnel counts shown are only estimates based on admittedly sparse
information. It is believed that the provided information is accurate enough to test the
principle foci of the modeling effort. Before any attempt at validity is done, better
estimates of forces and asset counts should be collected.
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Index # Assets CInittype Location
1 20,000 personnel Civilian N3
2 5,000 personnel Civil N4
3 500 personnel Civil N5
4 20,000 personnel Civil N6
5 20,000 personnel Civil N7
6 3,000 personnel Civil N8
7 10,000 personnel Civil N9
8 2,000 personnel Civil N10
9 1,000 personnel Civil N18
10 1,000 personnel Civil N20
11 1,000 personnel Civil N21
12 2,000 personnel Civil N22
13 1,000 personnel Civil Nil
14 1,000 personnel Civil N12
15 500 personnel Civil N17
Table B.l. Aideed Supporters (Green Force) Disposition
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Index # Assets Unit type Location
1 1,000 personnel Militia N3
r\ 200 personnel Militia N4
3 500 personnel Militia N5
4 500 personnel Militia N6
5 500 personnel Militia N7
6 500 personnel Militia N8
7 500 personnel Militia N9
8 500 personnel Militia N10
9 200 personnel Militia N18
10 500 personnel Militia N20
11 200 personnel Militia N21
12 200 personnel Militia N22
13 200 personnel Militia Nil
14 200 personnel Militia N12
15 200 personnel Militia N17
Table B.2. Aideed Clan (Red Force) Disposition
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Index # Assets .. -:-:lJrtit;ty:pe::: Location
1 3000 personnel Civilian N3
2 3000 personnel Civil N4
3 3000 personnel Civil N5
4 3000 personnel Civil N6
5 3000 personnel Civil N7
6 3000 personnel Civil N20
7 1000 personnel Civil N8
8 1000 personnel Civil N9
9 1000 personnel Civil N10
10 1000 personnel Civil N21
11 1000 personnel Civil N22
12 5000 personnel Civil N13
13 5000 personnel Civil N14
14 5000 personnel Civil N17
15 5000 personnel Civil N16
16 5000 personnel Civil N15
17 5000 personnel Civil N13
18 5000 personnel Civil N12
19 5000 personnel Civil Nil
20 5000 personnel Civil N17
Table B.3. Neutrals (White Force) Disposition
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APPENDIX C. UTILITY FUNCTION CURVES
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Figure C.l. Friendly Casualties
Utility Function
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Utility Function
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Figure C.5. Civilian Casualties Due To Lack Of Aid
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APPENDIX D. SAMPLE MODEL OUTPUT
— •• — • Initialization Data========
Weight for FC 0.4070
Weight for EC 0.4002
Weight for CC 0.0437
Weight for CA 0.0473
Weight for AD 0.1018
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